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"NO-DROP" CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS:
EXPLORING THE BOUNDS OF JUDICIAL
INTERVENTION IN THE LIVES OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS

Tamara L. Kuenneni
I.

INTRODUCrION

As the Supreme Court's decision in Castle Rock v. Gonzales 2 illustrates, the American legal system continues to struggle
with the development of appropriate legal responses to the
problems of domestic violence. 3 Although states now have spent
1. Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I
am grateful to Alan Chen, Kris Miccio, Deborah Epstein, Doug Rendleman, Christine Cimini, Sam Kamin, Laura Rovner, and Jennifer Dieringer for their thoughtful
comments on earlier drafts, and to Stephanie Fuqua for her research assistance.
2. 545 U.S. 748 (2005). In Castle Rock, Jessica Gonzales had a civil protection
order against her estranged husband. Id. at 752. One night Gonzales' husband took
the parties' daughters without permission, in violation of the order. Id. at 753. The
police told Ms. Gonzales there was nothing they could do. Id. at 753-54. At
3:20a.m., the husband arrived at the police station, opened fire, and was shot and
killed by the police. Id. The police found the bodies of all three daughters, whom
the husband had already murdered, in his truck. Id. Ms. Gonzales asserted that the
failure of the police to respond to her report of her husband's violation violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Id. at 754-55. Specifically, she alleged that because the protection order statute required police to arrest when they had probable cause to believe a restrained
party violated a provision of the order, she had a property interest in the enforcement of the terms of her order. Id. at 753.
3. Despite language in the Colorado statute telling police they "shall arrest"
perpetrators who violate civil protection orders, the Court reasoned that the police
had discretion to decide whether or not to do so. Id. at 757. The pertinent part of
the statute read as follows: "A peace officer shall arrest, or, if an arrest would be
impractical under the circumstances, seek a warrant for the arrest of a restrained
person when the peace officer has information amounting to probable cause that...
the restrained person has violated or attempted to violate any provision of a restraining order .... " Id. The Court found that other Colorado statutes used the
word "shall," but still gave police discretion, so that the statute underlying the protection order would have used much stronger language if it truly mandated police
action. Id. at 756. The Court thus held that there was no personal entitlement to
"something as vague and novel as enforcement of restraining orders." Id. at 757.
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many years experimenting with different approaches, policymakers and advocates face an inherent tension in the modern system
of legal remedies for domestic violence victims. On one hand,
battered women's 4 advocates have worked for years to persuade
the state to view and respond to domestic violence as a widespread social and public health concern, rather than a private
matter to be dealt with in the home. 5 Since nearly one third of
American women report physical or sexual abuse by a husband
or boyfriend at some point in their lives, 6 ensuring women's
safety is a natural and primary goal of the legal regime established to respond to this problem.
On the other hand, an important element of responding to
the problem is reestablishing and maintaining victims' sense of
control over their own lives. 7 For the past thirty years, battered
women's activists have been clear about the importance of autonomy for victims, free from the controlling behaviors of the batterer. 8 Ironically, some of the remedies adopted to protect
victims of domestic violence actually diminish victims' autonomy.
In the criminal realm, this is reflected in the movement to impose
"no drop" prosecutions, requiring the state to prosecute batterers even if the victim does not wish to pursue the case. 9
In the civil context, states have responded to domestic violence with the adoption of statutes authorizing courts to enter
civil protection orders (CPOs) to protect women from batterers,
and making it relatively easy for victims to obtain such orders.
State court judges hearing CPO cases consider both the policy
underlying CPOs and the impact of domestic violence on the
public when determining whether to grant or deny relief. Similar
considerations come into play when a victim requests that a CPO
4. This article refers to victims as women and perpetrators of intimate partner
violence as men, given empirical findings that most intimate partner violence is committed by men against women. See Patricia Tjaden & Nancy Theones, Full Report
of the Prevalence, Incidence, and Consequences of Violence Against Women, Policy

Implications, NCJ 183781, November 2000.
5. ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED

WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING
24, 45-46 (2000).
6. Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act
(VAWA III), Publ. L. No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960 (2005).

7. SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND
STRUGGLES OF THE BATTERED WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 317-319 (1982).
8. Id.
9. See generally Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions,109 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1996) (support-

ing aggressive prosecution policies in domestic violence cases).
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be vacated. In fact, some judges refuse to drop victims' orders
when they so request, reasoning that dissolution, or "vacatur,"
would be contrary to public policy.' 0 Such reasoning seems logical, given the seriousness with which judges are directed to, and
should, treat domestic violence. Nonetheless, this article argues
that while domestic violence is a public problem that merits a
serious response by the state, neither public policy nor the public's interest requires judges to maintain CPOs against the wishes
of victims. As explained below, doing so may even be contrary
to both.
A victim may wish to vacate her order for myriad reasons.
She may want to reconcile with the batterer rather than live without his financial support." Loss of that support may cause her to
be unable to pay her bills or to provide for her children. It may
mean the difference between maintaining a roof over her head or
becoming homeless, and as a consequence, facing violence at the
hands of a stranger. If the protection order prohibits the batterer
from contacting the parties' children, the victim may feel responsible or guilty, or may believe that this result is not in her children's best interest. Members of her family, religious institution,
12
and community may pressure her to keep the family together.
The batterer may pressure her to drop the order. Or it may be
10. See Stevenson v. Stevenson, 714 A.2d 986, 995 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1998) ("[A] real threat of recurrence of domestic violence by defendant upon his
battered wife will exist if the Final Restraining Order is dissolved. This court will
not be an accomplice to further violence by this defendant, by wholly dissolving at
this point the restraints that have been entered against him."); Irene D. v. Anthony
D., 449 N.Y.S.2d 584, 586 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1982) ("To permit a discontinuance as
regards the children would, in this Court's judgment, expose them to the very real
risk of imminent and potentially serious harm. Similarly, even a discontinuance of
the petitioner's individual claim would be inimical to the children's best interests.
Children cannot possibly remain unscathed in a home where their mother is made a
punching bag."); Tobkin v. Florida, 777 So.2d 1160, 1165 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)
("It indeed may be wise policy to require court approval prior to allowing a petitioner to dismiss a petition for an injunction for protection against domestic violence. The petitioner-victim may be intimidated into dropping the case by threats or
fear of the respondent. And, in view of these concerns, we invite the legislature and
the Family Law Rules Committee to consider whether legislation and a special dismissal rule is needed in cases involving injunctions against domestic violence. Nevertheless, the law does not presently require such court-approval.").
11. See Barbara J. Hart & Erika A. Sussman, Civil Tort Suits and Economic
Justice for Battered Women, 4 VICTIM ADVOC. 3, 4 (2004) (explaining that access to
economic viability is critical to the long-term safety of victims, but that civil protection orders and the majority of legal mechanisms available to battered women do
not account for this reality).
12. See, e.g., Christine O'Connor, Domestic Violence No-Contact Ordersand the
Autonomy Rights of Victims, 40 B.C. L. REv. 937, 958 (1999) (summarizing litera-
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that, while in effect, the protection order accomplished the goals
for which the victim obtained it, and she no longer needs or
wants the state's intervention in her life.
The dilemma for judges is that almost no state statutes or
published opinions provide specific criteria to analyze a victim's
motion to vacate her order. Armed with little but public policy
as a guide, state court judges struggle with the tension between
providing maximum protection to victims, for their safety and
that of the public, and respecting the autonomy of victims as civil
litigants in private rights of action.
In the absence of state law, federal doctrine regarding vacatur of traditional civil injunctions may provide a baseline from
which a judge may begin her analysis. This article applies federal
standards to published state court opinions regarding dissolution
of CPOs. It argues that denying a victim's motion to vacate a
protection order sharply departs from analogous federal decisions. In traditional civil injunction litigation, if neither party
wants the injunction, and particularly if the plaintiff no longer
wishes to enjoin the defendant, the court is hard-pressed to justify continued intervention in the relationship. Instead, the court
defers to the parties' wishes, except in the rare circumstance in
which it finds that vacatur would be detrimental to the public
13
interest.
This policy of deference to the parties, and particularly to
the plaintiff's decision to halt the litigation she initiated, recognizes the value placed on litigants' autonomy in civil, private
rights of action. Autonomy is particularly critical for litigants
who are also victims of domestic violence. While judges may feel
that it is better to "be safe than sorry" by keeping a protection
order in place rather than granting the victim's motion to vacate,
recent research suggests that the opposite may be true. Victims
ture regarding challenges faced by victims because of their ethnicity, race, class, and
religion).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 719 F.2d 558, 565 (2d Cir.
1983). Before a federal court weighs the public's interest against that of the named
parties, it first determines whether the statute underlying the injunction evinces a
clear legislative intent that the public's interest is at issue. Statutes are not always
explicit with regard to whether they regulate a matter of public concern, or a controversy more private in nature. Courts often must infer the intent of the law by examining its purpose and legislative history. Id. The inquiry is critical because, as stated
by the Supreme Court, courts do not have "broad license to promote the general
welfare" when invoking the public interest, and must therefore use care to advance
the purpose of the statute, rather than their own ideologies. NAACP v. Fed. Power
Comm'n, 425 U.S. 662, 666 (1976).
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who feel that officials listen, consider and respond to their needs
are less at risk of re-assault.' 4 When viewed in light of the fact
that data regarding the effectiveness of CPOs at preventing reassault is largely inconclusive,' 1 5 maintaining orders against the
wishes of victims may be over-relying on their efficacy and underestimating the value of the victim's feelings of personal choice
and empowerment to her physical safety.
While many CPO laws are explicit that their purpose is not
limited to preventing violence against the individual victim, but
to protecting the public as well, 16 state legislators have never ex14. See infra notes 257-58 and accompanying text.
15. See Lauren Bennett Cattaneo & Lisa A. Goodman, Risk Factors for
Reabuse in Intimate Partner Violence: A Cross-Disciplinary Critical Review, 6

& ABUSE 141 (2005) (conducting an extensive investigation of
published research from January 1990 to September 2003, the authors concluded
TRAUMA, VIOLENCE

that studies examining the effectiveness of civil protection orders varied so greatly in
their methodology that it was impossible to draw many conclusions with regard to
what legal interventions are effective at preventing re-assault, and of those that
could be drawn, little should be translated into practice at this point).
16. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-101 (2002) ("The General Assembly of the
State of Arkansas hereby finds that this chapter is necessary to secure important
governmental interests in the protection of victims of abuse and the prevention of
further abuse through the removal of offenders from the household and other injunctive relief for which there is no adequate remedy in current law. The General
Assembly hereby finds that this chapter shall meet a compelling societal need and is
necessary to correct the acute and pervasive problem of violence and abuse within
households in this state."); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-101(2) (2005) (protection orders of paramount importance because they promote safety, reduce violence, and
prevent serious harm and death); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-6302(2002) ("The purpose of this act is to address domestic violence as a serious crime against society and
to assure the victims of domestic violence the protection from abuse which the law
and those who enforce the law can provide .... It is the intent of the legislature that
the official response to cases of domestic violence shall stress the enforcement of the
laws to protect the victim and shall communicate the attitude that violent behavior
in the home is criminal behavior and will not be tolerated."); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
60/102 (1999) (underlying purposes of act include recognition that "domestic violence is a serious crime against the individual and society which produces family
disharmony in thousands of Illinois families ... which frequently culminates in intrafamily homicide" and recognition that "the legal system has ineffectively dealt with
family violence in the past ... and has not adequately acknowledged the criminal
nature of domestic violence ... in practice there is still widespread failure to appropriately protect and assist victims."); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2131 (1999) (official
response of law enforcement to protect the victim and communicate the attitude
that violent behavior will not be excused); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19A, § 4001
(1998) (recognition that domestic violence is a serious crime against the individual
and society that frequently results in intrafamily homicide); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 48-27-101 (2004) (recognition that domestic violence is a crime and major health
problem with enormous costs to the state in terms of money and lives; purpose of act
is to assure victims maximum protection from abuse and that domestic violence will
not be excused or tolerated).
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pressed the intent that the public interest should trump that of
the individual victim in maintaining a CPO against her will. If
it did, the distinction between the criminal and civil justice
systems' responses to domestic violence
17
inconsequential.

would be largely

In the criminal system, statutes mandating the arrest of batterers (such as the statute at issue in Castle Rock) and policies
requiring aggressive or "no-drop" prosecution of batterers direct
police and district attorneys to arrest and prosecute perpetrators
of domestic violence. These imperatives apply even when the vic-

tim disagrees, to protect the safety not just of the victim, but also
of society generally. 18 On the civil side, protection orders provide an alternative to criminal charges, or an additional remedy,
to give victims a degree of control over their cases that is lost
when the criminal justice system intervenes. 19 Statutory schemes

and legislative histories express the importance of victim autonomy, especially in light of the mandatory interventions in place in
20
the criminal context.
Though the distinction between civil and criminal remedies
is critical, it is often blurred by the large-scale involvement of the

criminal justice system in CPO cases, and particularly in their enforcement. The quasi-criminal nature of CPOs, as compared
with traditional civil injunctions, may cause a judge to take a
more interventionist, rather than deferential, approach.
Judges may be influenced by a number of other factors in-

trinsic to cases involving domestic violence that are not present
in other kinds of civil injunctions. For example, victims of domestic violence, compared with other groups of litigants, have
17. See, e.g., DC Council Rep. of May 12, 1982 on the Amendments to the DC
Intrafamily Offenses Act at 11 (1982) (stating that the Intrafamily Offenses Act
"was intended to provide family members with access to special court remedies
without interposing criminal sanction in the family circle," and further that "criminal
sanctions should not be the only avenue for correcting such abuses, because ...
threats to the long-term stability of the family or home may arise in the seeking of
criminal sanctions.").
18. See Hanna, supra note 9.
19. See Peter Finn & Sarah Colson, Civil Protection Orders: Legislation, Current-Court Practice, and Enforcement, 1990 National Institute of Justice 2-343 (NCJ
123263). See also, DC Council Rep., supra note 17 (stating that the Intrafamily Offenses Act "was intended to provide family members with access to special court
remedies without interposing criminal sanction in the family circle," and further that
"criminal sanctions should not be the only avenue for correcting such abuses, because ... threats to the long-term stability of the family or home may arise in the
seeking of criminal sanctions").
20. See Finn & Colson, supra note 19.
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tremendous credibility issues in court. 2 1 In addition, the psychological dynamics of domestic violence are complex, and judges
are not provided with sufficient time, information or training to
be able to adequately address them. 2 2 Judges become frustrated
with victims who appear to want to stay in abusive relationships,
with batterers who appear to flout court orders, and with the
problem of domestic violence generally. 23 Finally, judges may assume that battered women, by definition, are unable to make rational decisions with regard to what is in their best interest.
These factors may inappropriately skew judicial decision-making.
Yet other factors unique to domestic violence cases may legitimately cause judges to depart from the normal standard of
deference to litigants. Chief among these is the risk that the batterer is coercing the victim to vacate the order. Feminist activists
have argued for years that coercion is a fundamental component
of domestic violence, and that batterers use coercion to control
victims' behavior. 24 Given the possibility that a victim is being
coerced to vacate her order, supporting her autonomous decision-making in court is complex.
Though the differences between traditional civil injunctions
and protection orders complicate their comparison, application
of federal principles of vacatur to state court protection orders
nonetheless provides a useful gauge for assessing the legitimacy
of a judge's decision to depart from the normal standard of deference to the petitioner. State judges analyze batterers' motions
to vacate in accordance with the standards of law applied to
traditional civil injunctions. Perhaps victims' motions should be
analyzed similarly, despite the differences in their structure and
content.
Whatever approach a judge takes to a victim's motion to vacate, there will be a risk. Women who are victims of domestic
violence will be threatened or hurt or even killed, and the danger
of this happening may increase or decrease based in part on the
judge's decision. In the face of such risk, this article argues that
21. See generally Laurie S. Kohn, Barriers to Reliable Credibility Assessments:
Domestic Violence Victim-Witnesses, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 733
(2003).
22. See Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases:
Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors,Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J. L. &
FEMINISM 3, 39-44 (1999).

23. Id.
24. SUSAN SCHECHTER, GUIDELINES FOR MENTAL HEALTH PRACTITIONERS IN
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES 4 (1987).
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on balance, the cost of sacrificing victim autonomy in these cases
is too great, and that courts should defer to the victim's decision
to vacate, except in the limited circumstance in which doing so is
detrimental to an identifiable third party - specifically, the victim's child. Absent this exceptional circumstance, deferring to
the victim's wishes furthers the dual goals of the public policy
underlying protection order statutes: safety and autonomy.
Part II of this article reviews these policy goals and the intent of the drafters of protection order legislation. It then describes the challenge for judges created by broad public policies,
in the absence of specific statutory criteria for determining vacatur. Part III reviews federal standards of law governing traditional civil injunctions, and Part IV applies these principles to
state court CPO decisions for the purpose of analyzing the reasoning of some judges' reluctance to defer to victims' wishes to
vacate orders. It illustrates how this reasoning is skewed by factors that, while unique to CPO litigation, may not justify denial
of victims' motions to vacate.
Part V explores whether the public has an identifiable interest in the vacatur of an individual victim's CPO. While domestic
violence is a problem of enormous magnitude in this country,
and therefore impacts the public, this section suggests that the
drafters of CPO legislation did not intend for the public's interest
to trump that of the victim's when she chooses to vacate her order. It recognizes an important exception, however. Specifically,
the interests of a child may outweigh that of the individual victim's, if the child is at risk of danger by the dissolution of the
protection order. Nonetheless, the article concludes that even if
the public or a child has an interest in CPO litigation, deferring
to a victim's decision to vacate her order may be more likely to
protect her and her child from future assault, and thus better
serve the public and third party interests, while simultaneously
supporting the individual victim's autonomy.
II.

CIVIL PRoTEcrION ORDERS

Consideration of the purposes of CPO statutes is critical to a
clear understanding of the dilemmas inherent in the existing remedial system for domestic violence. This section reviews the
underlying purpose and history of protection order legislation. A
principal goal of the drafters was autonomy for victims of domestic violence. Thus, in addition to prevention of physical violence,
victim autonomy ought to be considered by judges when victims
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ask that their orders be vacated. But very few state statutes set
forth this or any factor for a judge to consider when presented
with a victim's motion to vacate. Instead, judges are left with
broad policy mandates to take domestic violence seriously and to
convey the message that domestic violence is a crime that will not
be tolerated, with scarce further direction. As noted earlier, in
the absence of specific criteria to apply, these policies create a
tension between respecting the victim's autonomy as a civil litigant in a private right of action, and protecting her as a victim of
the crime of domestic violence. The section concludes by summarizing the handful of existing state statutes governing vacatur
of victims' motions.
A.

Purposes Underlying Civil Protection Orders

Though traditional civil injunctions have deep historical
roots, dating back to the Court of Chancery in England, 25 the
first CPO legislation was not passed until 1970.26 Before that,
the only civil remedy available to victims of domestic violence
was a restraining order within the context of a larger lawsuit most commonly, a divorce.2 7 Only married women, and of them,
only those who could afford representation by an attorney, were
eligible for this relief.28 Even for this narrowly defined group of
litigants, the cost, time, and complexity of seeking the court's
protection proved prohibitive, and the only available relief
within the order was limited to a provision instructing the batterer to stay away. 29
Battered women's advocates were aware that much more
was going on in battering relationships than individual acts of assault. They knew that batterers were coercing victims, not just
physically hurting them, in order to control their behavior. 30 As
early as 1976, Susan Schechter, a pioneer of the Battered Women's Movement, defined battering as "a pattern of coercive
control that one person exercises over another. Abusers use
25. See

OWEN

M. Fiss,

INJUNCIONS 74 (1972).

26. The District of Columbia Intrafamily Offenses Act was adopted by Congress on July 29, 1970. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1001, et seq. (2005).
27. See Nina W. Tarr, Civil Orders for Protection: Freedom or Entrapment?, 11
WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y 157, 161 (2003).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See Wife Beating: Government Intervention Policies and Practices, (Testimony of Marjorie Fields before the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights), Washington,
D.C., January 30-31, 1978.
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physical and sexual violence, threats, emotional insults and economic deprivation as a way to dominate their partners and get
'3 1
their way."
When crafting protection order statutes in the 1970s, advocates knew that victims' autonomy of decision-making, free from
batterers' coercion, must be a central goal of legislation.
A new remedy was needed. One that would enjoin the perpetrator from future abuse. One that would not displace the
abused woman from her home but could compel relocation of
the abuser. One that could constrain the abusing husband
from interfering with and disrupting the life of the abused woman and children. One that could provide stability and predictability in the lives of women and children. One that would
give the mother authority to act as primary caretaker of her
children; limiting the risk of abduction by the father to coerce
reconciliation or to penalize the abused woman from revealing
the violence or terminating the relationship. One that could
afford economic support so that the abused woman would not
be compelled to return to the abuser to feed, clothe and house
her children. One that would sharply limit the power of the
battering husband or partner to coerce reconciliation. One
that would advance the autonomy and independence of the
battered woman from
the abuser. Civil protection orders were
32
this new remedy.
In 1970, the District of Columbia 33 passed the first CPO statute. By 1980, forty-five states implemented similar legislation. 34
Today all jurisdictions in the United States provide CPOs for victims of intimate or family violence.
As statutory remedies have been honed over the past thirty
years, CPOs have come a significant way to provide victims with
the autonomy that the drafters had in mind. Expansion of the
relief available within the order provides women with far more
options than they had previously. A victim may be able to: oust
the batterer from a shared residence; obtain child custody and
visitation; get child support and other financial support; require
the batterer to participate in domestic violence counseling; and
obtain other relief unique to her situation that the court, in its
discretion, finds will prevent further abuse. The wide array of
relief available to victims - relief not available in the context of a
31. SCHECHTER, supra note 24 at 4.
32. Barbara J. Hart, State Codes on Domestic Violence: Analysis, Commentary
and Recommendations, 43 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 3, 23 (1992).
33. See supra statutes cited note 26.

34. See CLARE DALTON
AND THE LAW 498 (2001).

&

ELIZABETH

M.

SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN
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criminal prosecution of domestic violence - provides victims reasons, in addition to preventing physical assault, to obtain these
35
orders.
Indeed, research indicates that victims who obtain CPOs do
so for many reasons other than, or perhaps in addition to,
preventing future assault. Karla Fischer and Mary Rose found
that victims obtained orders for three primary reasons: 1) to
have control in their lives; 2) to have the law act as a "loudspeaker" that society was intolerant of the abuse; and 3) to create
a public record documenting the abuse 36 so that should the batterer commit more violence, including homicide, there would be
evidence of the batterer's past conduct, and the batterer would
37
not just "get away with it."

Fisher and Rose found that 86% of the victims they interviewed thought that the batterer would violate the order, yet
98% reported feeling more in control of their lives and 89% felt
more in control of their relationships after obtaining a temporary
protection order. 38 Similarly, in a study conducted by Adele
Harrell and Barbara Smith, less than half the women believed
the batterer would obey the order, yet 79% said it was helpful in
39
sending her partner a message that his actions were wrong.
While a judge in a CPO case may see the primary purpose of
the order as preventing the batterer from physically abusing the
victim, the petitioner may believe this result to be one of several,
though perhaps not even the most critical or realistic, purposes of
the order. Understanding the victim's real reasons for obtaining
the protection order ought to be critical to judges' analyses when
determining whether to vacate that order later. For example, at a
vacatur hearing, it may appear to a judge that the CPO did not
accomplish the goal of prohibiting the batterer from contacting
35. See Adele Harrell & Barbara E. Smith, Effects of Restraining Orders on
Domestic Violence Victims, in Do ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 214,

218 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa, eds., 1996). In the context of temporary
protection orders, 25% of women wanted specifics about visitation of their partner
with their shared children; 19% wanted provisions prohibiting the partner from
coming to her place of work and parents' homes; 7% wanted property held by their
partner returned. Id. The authors found that these provisions were desired by but
not awarded to victims who obtained temporary orders). Id.
36. See Karla Fischer & Mary Rose, When "Enough is Enough": Battered Women's Decision Making Around Court Orders of Protection, 41 CRIME & DELINQ.
414, 423 (1995).
37. Id. at 420-22.
38. Id. at 417.
39. See Harrell & Smith, supra note 35, at 218.
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the victim. From the point of view of the victim, however, the

order may have helped her achieve her primary goal of taking
control of the relationship, or of conveying to the batterer that
she will seek help from the legal system when she needs it, and

that the system will respond.
Data show that even temporary protection orders, typically
in place for only a couple of weeks, help victims achieve their
goals. Significant numbers of victims who obtain temporary orders do not return to court to convert them to final orders, but let
them expire. 40 In describing their reasons for dropping, most wo-

men simply said that the order had given them what they
41

needed.

Although judges hearing motions to vacate may not consider
the array of reasons the victim obtained the order, beyond that of
preventing future violence, this limitation is understandable.

While state statutory schemes explicitly state the specific criteria
that victims must meet in order to obtain an order, few explain,
or even mention, what if any showing a victim must make in order to vacate it.
B.

The Problem: Lack of Guidance for Analyzing Victims'
Motions to Vacate CPOs

When a victim chooses to vacate a CPO, she must obtain
leave of the court to do So. 4 2 Though almost all state statutes
provide standards of law for modification or reconsideration of
an order, 43 less than half mention vacatur of a final order 4 4 and
40. See Fischer & Rose, supra note 36, at 427 (explaining that approximately
50% of women nation wide do not convert the temporary order into a final order).
41. Id.
42. Although petitioners may not vacate orders without leave of court, in some
states, the petitioner's conduct has been held to nullify the enforceability of the
order.
43. However, Connecticut, North Carolina, Wisconsin and Wyoming have no
explicit statutory provision governing modification or reconsideration of orders.
44. Amiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(l) (2001) provides that after hearing, the
court may quash the order, but the statute is ambiguous with regard to whether this
language refers only to the continuation of the ex parte order, or if it means that a
permanent order may be vacated; CAL. FAM. CODE § 6345(a) (2004) provides that
upon written stipulation of the parties or upon motion of a party, the order is subject
to termination; CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-14-102(17.5) (2005) provides that nothing

shall preclude the protected party from applying to the court at any time for dismissal of a permanent order; D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005(d) (2005) provides that the
court may, upon motion of a party, rescind a protection order for good cause shown;
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1045(d) (1999) says that the protective order may be
rescinded during the term of the order upon motion; FL. STAT. § 741.30(10) (2005)
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of these, only six jurisdictions set forth rules specifically applicable to a victim's motions for vacatur. 45 This paucity of legislation
leaves courts with almost no guidance in determining these
motions.
Even in the fraction of jurisdictions that have laws specifically addressing victims' motions, most give judges enormous discretion. For example, Montana provides that an order may be
terminated upon the petitioner's request. 46 In South Carolina, if
the parties reconcile the petitioner may obtain a dismissal of the
provides that either party may move the court to dissolve an injunction at any time;
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/224(f) (1999) provides that other provisions in the statute
do not limit a party's ability to vacate an order; IND. CODE § 34-26-5-12 (1998) provides that if a petitioner files a written request or makes an oral request on the
record to dismiss the case in open court the court shall without delay or any conditions dismiss the case without prejudice; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.,19A § 4006(7)
(1998) does not limit the means for obtaining dissolution or discharge of an order;
MD. CODE ANN., family § 4-507 (2004) states that a protective order may be rescinded during its term; MA. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 3 (2003) refers to vacating orders, but provides only that the fact abuse has not occurred during the pendency of
an order shall not, in itself, constitute sufficient grounds for allowing the order to be
vacated; MICH. COMP. LAWS Ann. § 600.2950(c) (2002) provides that a court may
offer an advocate to assist a victim in rescinding a personal protection order; Mo.
REV. STAT. § 455.060(5) (2003) states that an order shall terminate upon the filing of
a motion to terminate by the petition except in cases where custody of a minor child
is granted to the respondent the order will terminate only upon consent of the respondent or failure by the respondent to file a timely objection to the dismissal;
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-204 (2006) states that the order may be terminated upon
the petitioner's request that the order be dismissed; NEV. REV. STAT. Ann. § 33.080
(2002) provides that the restrained party may move to dissolve or modify the temporary order; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:5 (2002 & Supp. 2006) says that either
party who wishes the defendant to be excused from any provisions of an order may
petition the court; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(d) (2005) provides that upon good
cause shown a final order may be dissolved; N.M. STAT. § 40-13-6(B) (2006) states
that injunctive orders shall continue until modified or rescinded upon motion by
either party or until the court approves a subsequent consent agreement entered
into by the parties; OKLA. STAT. Ann. Tit. 22, § 60.4(G)(3) (2005) states that either
party may file a motion to vacate, that a hearing will be set and that the court will
take "such action as is necessary under the circumstances"; OR. REV. STAT.
§ 107.720(2)(b) (2005) provides that a restraining order shall not be terminated upon
a motion for dismissal by the petitioner unless the motion is notarized; S.C. CODE
ANN. § 20-4-70(A) (Supp. 2005) provides that an order may be terminated upon
motion by either party showing good cause, and that if the parties reconcile, the
court may grant an order of dismissal without a hearing if the petitioner appears
personally at the offices of the issuing court, shows proper identification and signs a
written request to dismiss based on the reconciliation; UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-64.2(10) (1998 & Supp. 2006) states that a court may vacate; VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1279.1(F) (2003 & Supp. 2006) provides that either party may at any time file a written motion requesting a hearing to dissolve an order.
45. Id. Indiana, Colorado, Montana, Missouri, Oregon, and South Carolina
mention procedures applicable specifically to the protected party's desire to vacate.
46.

MONT. CODE ANN.

§ 40-15-204 (2006).
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order upon written request. 47 Similarly in Oregon, an order may
be vacated if the petitioner submits a notarized motion so requesting. 48 New Jersey and the District of Columbia permit the
movant to vacate a final protection order for good cause shown,
but neither statute specifies whether this burden is the same for a
49
petitioner as for a respondent seeking vacatur.
Only two states mandate what action a judge must take
when presented with a victim's motions to vacate. In Indiana, if
a petitioner files a written request or makes an oral request on
the record to dismiss the case, "the court shall without delay or
any conditions dismiss the case without prejudice. ' 50 In Missouri, the court "shall terminate" the order upon "the filing of a
51
motion to terminate .. by the petitioner.1
The dearth of statutes addressing motions to vacate and the
broad discretion expressed in most of those that do, leaves judges
with little guidance in reaching decisions. 52 One judge's statements regarding her approach to vacatur so reflect. Explaining
how difficult these decisions are, she stated
I think you have to balance the realities of a judicial obligation
(which presumably is a statute that says "may" vacate) with an
understanding of the dynamics that must allow a historically
disempowered victim the opportunity and information to
make a self-choice. I would be hard pressed to think about
47.

S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-70(A) (Supp. 2005).

48.

OR. REv. STAT.

§ 107.720 (2)(b) (2005).

49. In the District of Columbia, the court may, upon motion of a party, rescind
a protection order for good cause shown. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005(d) (2005). The
New Jersey Prevention of Domestic Violence Act provides that upon good cause
shown, a final restraining order may be dissolved so long as the judge who dissolves
the order is the same judge who entered it or has a complete record of the underlying hearing available to him or her. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(d) (2005).
50. IND. CODE § 34-26-5-12 (1998).
51. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.060(5) (West 2006).
52. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Mitchell, 821 N.E.2d 79 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) in which
the court was presented with an appeal from the denial of a batterer's motion to
vacate. To determine what standard of law applied, the court first looked to the
state abuse of prevention statute, but found that no standard was articulated. See id.
at 85. Next the court looked to case law, but found "scant authority discussing the
specific standard for modifying or terminating .... " Id. at 87. It then examined
case law interpreting other aspects of the statute, finding only that the court's authority is broad and that "judicial discretion involves making a circumstantially fair
and reasonable choice within a range of permitted options." Id. The court also
reviewed cases and statutes governing modification of divorce and child custody orders, finding modification to be appropriate upon a showing of a substantial or "material and substantial" change in circumstances. Id. at 88. It then turned to and
applied federal principles of modification and vacatur of traditional civil injunctions.
Id.

2007]

"NO DROP" CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS

53

what might trump her self-choice (only protecting a vulnerable
child, maybe, or a significantly impaired victim). The choice
doesn't have to be "right" since victims like anyone else are
allowed to make "wrong" choices, but I want to feel that the
petitioner has some minimal level of insight - which level I
can't define. I'm just wanting to make sure she has accurate
information
and understands it - and then she can make the
53
choice.
The problem illustrated in this quotation can be understood
as a tension between respecting "battered women as experts in
their own lives, and in knowing how a particular institutional response is likely to affect their safety" and judges' charge of "making immediate decisions that affect the safety of each individual
battered woman who comes before them, decisions that also
have implications for batterer accountability and broader public
safety." In response to this dilemma, the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges and the Battered Women's Justice Project convened a round table discussion in September
2005.54
Advocates and attorneys with expertise in civil and criminal
protection orders discussed how judges should approach victims'
motions to "drop" protection orders. 55 Their responses to specific factual scenarios in which a petitioner sought to vacate fell
along a continuum, and moved back and forth depending on the
circumstances, with "drop the order" at one end and "do not
drop" at the other. 56 The only overarching agreement was that
"there can be no single, universal response to a victim's request
to dismiss a civil protection order ...The 'stereotypical battered
woman' does not exist, and protocols and decisions based on sim53. Email from Hon. Maureen McKnight, Multnomah County Circuit Court
Judge, Portland, Oregon to author (May 23, 2003, 01:41pm EST) (on file with author). See also Interview with Judge Richard Halloran, Wayne County Circuit Court
Judge, Detroit, Mich. (Mar. 22, 2005) (stating that he always tries to convince victims
to modify before allowing them to vacate their orders, and that if they won't modify,
he makes them wait two weeks before allowing them to vacate) (on file with author); Interview with Judge J. Wesley Saint Claire, King County Superior Court
Judge, Seattle, Wash. (Mar. 22, 2005) (explaining that the victim is the person who
can best assess wither she is in danger, not the judge, and that given the fact that the
state statute is silent, if the victim feels that continuance of the order will put her in
more danger, he will vacate) (on file with author). The author acknowledges the
anecdotal nature of these interviews.
54. National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges and The Battered
Women's Justice Project, Critical Issues Seminar: You be the Judge, in Minneapolis,
MN (Sept. 26-27, 2005) [hereinafter Discussion Notes].
55. Id. at 2.
56. Id. at 2-3.
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plistic categories or rigid formulas will yield misleading and po'57

tentially dangerous results.
While there is little legislative guidance to assist courts in
58
these decisions, there is also an absence of appellate case law.
Only two reported opinions directly address the specific scenario
in which a victim moved to vacate her CPO, and these were trial

court decisions. 59 In the absence of statutes and common law on
point, some judges have relied upon the principles applied by
federal court judges analyzing vacatur of injunctions.
III.
A.

MODIFICATION AND VACATUR OF CIVIL INJUNCTIONS

Civil Protection Orders Are Civil Injunctions

An injunction is a civil court order that, at its most basic,
directs a defendant to do something or not do something. 6° The
plaintiff must prove that this "something" - typically a directive
to cease some activity - is necessary to prevent continued or future injury. In this way, an injunction has been described as "the
judicial ordering of a relationship in conflict" in which the authority and power of the court are placed at the service of the
57. Id. at 23.
58. Several factors may explain this scarcity of case law. Given that protection
order statutes are designed for litigants to represent themselves in these cases, and
the fact that most victims of domestic violence do indeed appear pro se, it may be
that victims whose motions are denied do not possess the legal knowledge or skill to
file appeals. In many states the time for filing an appeal runs very quickly, making it
challenging for litigants to learn the process or find, let alone afford, an attorney
who can assist. Victims may feel disempowered and revictimized by the denial of
their motions at the trial court level, and hence lack the motivation to file an appeal.
Alternatively, victims may feel that because the order does not restrain their actions,
but instead restrains the batterer's actions, appealing a trial court's decision may not
be worth the time, energy, and risks inherent in continued litigation. These victims
may instead decide to ignore the protection order by having contact with, or allowing contact by, the batterer. It should be noted that such a decision may have
serious, detrimental consequences, however. See generally, DALTON & SCHNEIDER,
supra note 34 at 537-38 (describing cases in which victims have been criminally
charged with aiding and abetting, have been found in contempt of the civil protection order despite the fact that they have not violated it but the batterer has). Additionally, victims who reconcile without first vacating may not be taken seriously by
the police when they call for help, or may be admonished by child protective
services.
59. See Stevenson v. Stevenson, 714 A.2d 986 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1998);
I.J. v. I.S., 744 A.2d 1246 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1999), discussed in Section V,
infra.
60. See, e.g., Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, From Swift to Stotts and Beyond: Modification of Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1101 (1986).
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victim to compel someone else - the violator - to respect the
61
victim's rights.
Although generally treated as a unique class of remedy,
CPOs are conceptually no different than other civil injunctions,
as several state court opinions have recognized. 62 They are civil
court orders directing the respondent both to do something and
not to do something. 6 3 They direct the respondent to stay away
from the victim, and they direct him not to abuse, harass, annoy
or molest her. In so doing, CPOs are a classic example of "the
' 64
judicial ordering of a relationship in conflict.
Because a CPO is an equitable remedy, judges presiding
over CPO cases retain broad discretion to issue, modify and vacate these orders. This discretion includes conducting the costbenefit analysis that judges would conduct for any other type of
injunction. 65 For instance, if the victim and batterer have a child
in common, the court will weigh the benefit of restraining the
batterer from having any contact with the victim against the cost
to the batterer of not being allowed to visit his child, who may
live with the victim or of whom the victim has legal custody. It
will also weigh the costs and benefits to the child, a third party to
the litigation, of not having visitation with his father. After conducting this analysis, the court may tailor the protection order to
provide a visitation plan between the father and child that maximizes the safety to the victim while preserving the interests of
both the batterer and child. The court may ultimately determine
that visitation is in the best interest of the child, but may limit the
location, time and frequency of visitation to assure that these factors do not put the victim at risk.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Cruz-Foster v. Foster, 597 A.2d 929, 930 (D.C. 1991); Mitchell v.
Mitchell, 821 N.E.2d 79, 87 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (noting a number of published
decisions in which states treated CPOs as they would any other civil injunction).
63. See Finn & Colson, supra note 19, at V (defining a civil protection order as
"a legally binding court order that prohibits an individual who has committed an act
of domestic violence from further abusing the victim").
64. Jost, supra note 60.
65. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-313 (1982). The classic
example of this balancing of remedies is Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870
(N.Y. 1970), in which a judge, in the case of a factory that has been shown to pollute
the environment, may consider ordering that the factory be closed until the pollution
is controlled. Before issuing this order, the judge may consider factors such as the
loss of jobs to the factory workers, as well as the benefit to the public of the cessation of the pollution. Inquiry with regard to third parties and the public interest is

necessary because injunctive relief frequently impacts them.
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The court may also consider the interest of the public, often
defined by the public policy underlying the state's CPO statute.

For example, the statute may explicitly state that domestic violence is a crime that will not be tolerated by the state against its
citizens. Such a policy consideration may influence the decisions
that state court judges, like their federal court colleagues, make
at all stages of protection order litigation, including issuance,

modification and vacatur.
The Supreme Court has decided a number of cases involving
the modification and vacatur of injunctions under federal law,
and has articulated standards applicable to these motions.

Though state law, not federal, governs vacatur, the scarcity of
state statutes and published decisions has caused some courts to
rely upon the standards set forth by the Supreme Court for guidance in interpreting their own statutory schemes, 6 6 and others
to directly apply these standards to CPO cases. 67 Because a

plaintiff's uncontested motion to vacate a traditional injunction
provides the closest analogy to a victim's motion to vacate a protection order, 68 this discussion turns first to this procedural
posture.
B.

Uncontested Motions for Modification/Vacatur

When the protected party seeks to vacate an injunction, it
seeks to remove altogether the conditions imposed upon the defendant. Hence it is rare that defendants contest plaintiffs' mo-

66. See cases cited infra note 68.
67. See, e.g., Cruz-Foster,597 A.2d, at 930, in which the victim moved to extend
her CPO under the Intrafamily Offenses Act in D.C. The relevant provision of the
statute stated that an order may be extended, modified, or rescinded upon good
cause shown, but the court noted that "good cause" was not defined in the statute.
Id. at 929. The court applied the federal principles regarding injunctions, holding
that in a motion to extend a CPO, the victim must meet the same burden of proof
required of a party seeking an initial injunction under federal law, explaining: "This
is the normal standard in civil cases, and we see no reason to apply a different one
here." Id. at 930. Similarly, in dicta, the court stated: "A party moving to dissolve
an existing injunction has the burden to demonstrate an unforeseen change of circumstances which would render it unjust to keep the court's order in effect." Id.
68. Recently, in Mitchell v. Mitchell, 821 N.E.2d 79, 87 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005),
the appellate court created a test for batterers' contested motions to vacate Massachusetts abuse prevention orders based on Supreme Court doctrine. See also
Sjomeling v. Stuber, 615 N.W.2d 613, 616 (S.D. 2000), in which the court applied the
test for modification and vacatur of injunctions set forth by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Swift, discussed infra Section IIIC.
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tions to vacate. 69 In analyzing uncontested, or agreed upon,
motions for vacatur, courts customarily defer to the parties'
wishes. 70 The exception to this standard of deference is when the
court finds that the law underlying the injunction concerns a public interest, and the parties' desire to vacate or modify the injunction has a detrimental impact on that interest. 71 This section
focuses on how federal courts analyze whether the public interest
is implicated in a given case.
First, the court examines whether the legislature intended
that the law underlying the injunction regulate a matter of public
interest. In antitrust cases, the subject of much federal court doctrine involving injunctive relief, the regulatory legislation is the
Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act ("APPA," also known as
the Tunney Act). 72 The Act explicitly states that before a court
may approve a consent decree, it must make an independent de73
termination that entry of the judgment is in the public interest
69. An example of an exception might be when a state actor wants to comply
with the conditions imposed by the injunction, such as reform of a public school, but
because of budgetary reasons cannot do so without a court order mandating such
compliance.
70. See United States v. W. Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283, 305 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see
also John D. Anderson, Note, Modifications of Antitrust Decrees: Over a Double
Barrel, 84 MIcH. L.R. 134, 135 (1985) (explaining that the standard for modification
in contested cases is significantly more difficult to meet than the standard in consented-to cases); William M. Kelly, Construction and Modification of Antitrust Consent Decrees: New Approaches After the Antitrust Proceduresand Penalties Act of
1974, 77 COLUM. L.Rev. 296, 304 (1977) (where the parties have agreed to modification, judicial approval tends to be pro forma).
71. See Western Electric, 900 F.2d at 305, made clear that the common law approach to modification and vacatur of a decree requires "a less demanding standard
of review" when the motion is uncontested. Specifically, "when all parties to a decree assent to a particular modification, the relevant inquiry is whether the result
comports with the public interest." Id. In this case, the trial court should have, but
did not, consider the impact of vacatur on the public, given the far - reaching impact
of the injunction. The initial decree was between the government and AT&T to
break up the monopoly of the telecommunications equipment industry created by
AT&T. Id. at 291. Because vacatur might have left in tact many of the same anticompetitive advantages AT&T enjoyed prior to its break-up, which in turn would
have affected literally thousands of people, the court remanded, directing the trial
court to consider this impact. Id. at 309.
Western Electric relied upon United States v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 719 F.2d 558,
565 (2d Cir. 1983), another case involving an antitrust consent decree. After reiterating that the standard for determining an uncontested motion to vacate or modify is
deference plus no detriment to the public, the Second Circuit cautioned that the
term "public interest" should be limited to how it is defined in the law underlying
the injunction. Id. at 565.
72. Anti-trust Procedures & Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 16(b)-(h) (1982).
73. Anti-trust Procedures & Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(2) (1982). Although this Act only requires a public interest inquiry when the court enters the
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and defines the criteria courts should use in determining the public interest, including the competitive impact of the judgment
generally and the impact upon individuals alleging specific injury
74
from the violations set forth in the complaint.
In contrast to the Tunney Act, however, the laws underlying
many injunctions are not explicit with regard to whether the public has an interest, or how that interest should be analyzed. State
CPO laws are illustrative. The text of the statutes and the policies behind them explain that their goals are to protect individual
victims and the safety of the public. The courts are thus left to
infer whether the protection order is a matter of public interest
75
or a matter of autonomy for the individual victim.
Federal courts must also make this inference, in the absence
of explicit text within the underlying statute stating that the public interest is an issue. NAACP v. FederalPower Commission76 is
an example of how the Supreme Court has conducted this analysis. The NAACP petitioned the Federal Power Commission to
require the companies it regulated to provide equal employment
opportunities. The Court held that although the underlying law,
the Power and Gas Acts, used the words "public interest" in its
text and the law was "affected with a public interest," the Act
was really about regulating the transmission and sale of natural
gas. 77 Eliminating discrimination, although an important national goal, was not contemplated in the statute: "This Court's
cases have consistently held that the use of the words 'public interest' in a regulatory statute is not a broad license to promote
the general public welfare. Rather, the words take meaning from
'78
the purposes of the regulatory legislation.
Federal judges also examine the nature of the conduct being
regulated by the underlying law and the number of people affected in analyzing whether the public interest is implicated. In
Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation No. 40,79 the defendant
railway argued that an injunction could not prohibit it from condecree, one scholar has noted that since passage of the Act, courts are more likely to
make this inquiry in the modification posture. Anderson, supra note 70, at note 59.
74. Id.
75. See Section VI, infra.

76. 425 U.S. 662, 667 (1976). Though this case does not involve an injunction,
both Western Electric and American Cyanamid, see supra notes 70 and 71, rely upon
it.

77. NAACP, 425 U.S. at 667.
78. Id.
79. 300 U.S. 515 (1937).
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tracting with employees other than those designated as union
representatives because the law underlying the injunction, the
Railway Labor Act, did not impose this obligation. 80
The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that Congress expressed that the peaceable settlement of labor controversies, especially when those controversies involved interstate carriers,
was a matter of public concern. 8 1 Because more was involved
"than the settlement of a private controversy without appreciable
consequences to the public, '' 82 courts could compel conduct that
they might traditionally not compel in furtherance of the public
interest. 83 The operation of railroads, 84 buses, 85 and public utilities86 has long been identified with the public interest.
The same is true for the reform of public institutions. For
example, in cases involving the reform of prisons, the Court has
found that release of prisoners into the general public would be
contrary to the public interest 87 and that the public has an interest in the effective operation of its institutions.8 8 Similarly, the
reform of hospitals and public schools 89 has been found to clearly
implicate the public interest.
As the above cases make clear, the public interest is a significant factor that courts may weigh in determining whether to
grant or deny injunctive relief. 90 But absent an explicit legislative statement that the public interest is at issue, explicit mention
80. Id. at 544.
81. Id. at 551.
82. Id. at 552.
83. Id.
84. Joy v. City of St. Louis, 183 U.S. 1, 47 (1891).
85. See, e.g., Sexton v. Pub. Serv. Coordinated Transp., 68 A.2d 648 ( N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1949) (no injunction against bus company; public interest was
involved).
86. See, e.g., Edison Illuminating Co. v. E. Pa. Power Co., 98 A. 652 (Pa. 1916)
(power company was public service corporation and there was a public interest).
87. See, e.g., Duran v. Elrod, 760 F.2d 756, 761 (7th Cir. 1985) ("To loose 500
accused felons, most with felony records, on the people of Cook County within a
period of seven weeks is to launch a crime wave, and thereby imposes a greater cost
on society than the cost to the inmates' expectations, and to the sanctity of consent
decrees, of allowing the limited modification that the County sought.").
88. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 381 (1992), citing
Heath v. De Courcy, 888 F.2d 1105, 1109 (6th Cir. 1989) (institutional reform decrees "reach beyond the parties directly involved in the suit and impact on the public's right to the sound and efficient operations of its institutions").
89. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 381, citing New York State Assn. for Retarded Children,
Inc. v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956, 969 (2nd Cir. 1983).
90. See Duran, 760 F.2d at 759 ("This is true whether the judge is being asked
to approve a decree ... or it seems evident, modify a decree.").

UCLA WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 16:39

or definition of "public interest" in the statute, or explanation of
how that interest should be analyzed, courts must use care not to
equate "public interest" with "general welfare." 91
The inconsistency with which courts invoke the public interest as a justification to allow or deny relief has led some scholars
to characterize its use as purely results-oriented, 92 and to caution
that courts must not "adopt a concept of the public interest contrary to that found in a statute or the Constitution, or one primarily motivated by a political judgment not recognized by the
93
substantive law."
This caution applies with equal force to state court judges
hearing CPO cases. If state courts determine that protection order statutes regulate a matter of public interest, they must also
determine whether that interest outweighs the individual petitioner's. When courts depart from the normal standard of deference given parties in uncontested motions, they, like federal
court judges, should have well-founded, rather than results-oriented reasons for so doing.
In one protection order case, the court did not merely depart from the normal standard of deference; it did the polar opposite. 94 It imposed upon the victim the same burden of proof
required of a restrained party filing a contested motion to va96
cate. 95 And it did so in the name of the public interest.
Because CPO statutes do not evince a clear legislative intent
that the public has an interest in the litigation, and because most
statutes are silent with regard to whether the same standard of
law applies to a victim's uncontested motion as to a batterer's
contested motion to vacate, this discussion turns to federal
courts' analyses of contested motions. These principles make
clear that any burden imposed upon a protected party, even in
the circumstance in which the protected party seeks to tighten
91. NAACP v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 425 U.S. 662, 667 (1976).
92. Gene R. Shreve, FederalInjunctions and the Public Interest, 51 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 382, 390 (1983).

93. Jost, supra note 60 at 1149.
94. See Stevenson v. Stevenson, 714 A.2d 986 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1998).
See infra Section V.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 994 (explaining that when a victim of domestic violence is unable to
make a decision in her own best interest, public policy dictates that the court, in
assuring the maximum protection from abuse the law can provide, must make independent factual findings based on objective evidence regarding the future need for
the order, rather than deferring to the victim's stated desire).
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the restrictions of the injunction, must be significantly less onerous than that placed on a restrained party seeking vacatur.
C.

Contested Motions for Modification/Vacatur

The leading Supreme Court case setting forth the standard
of law applicable to a contested motion to modify is United States
v. Swift & Co. 97 The defendants, five meat-packing companies,
monopolized the meat industry. 98 They moved to modify restrictions imposed on them, alleging that conditions in the industry
had changed to such an extent that the dangers sought to be remedied by the decree were no longer present, and that to continue
the order would constitute extreme hardship. 99
The Court disagreed: "Life is never static ....The inquiry
for us is whether the changes are so important that dangers, once
substantial, have become attenuated to a shadow.... Nothing
less than a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and
unforeseen conditions should lead us to change what was decreed after years of litigation with the consent of all concerned." 1°° Justice Cardozo's opinion was unambiguous in its
articulation of a very heavy burden of proof for defendants.
Only a substantial change in circumstance - plus a showing that
the conduct prohibited in the initial order had become virtually
non-existent - would suffice.10 1
Although courts of equity always have the power to modify
injunctions to adapt to changing conditions, they distinguish between cases in which the facts or circumstances are likely to
change, and thus are provisional in nature, and those in which
the facts are "so nearly permanent as to be substantially impervious to change.' 0 2 CPOs are the former. Cases governing family
and intimate relationships are not "impervious to change."
These relationships are not static, but dynamic. This is true particularly in relationships characterized by intimate violence, in
which victims may separate from, and return to, their abusive
partners several times.
97. 286 U.S. 106 (1932).

98. Id. at 110.
99. Id. at 118.
100. Id.
101. In the years following Swift, this "grievous wrong" standard for modification has been characterized as Draconian. See Jost, supra note 60, at 1110.

102. Swift, 286 U.S. at 114.
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Not only do protection orders govern the relationship between the petitioner and respondent, but also between the parties and their children. Thus "myriad circumstances arise ...
during the pendency of an abuse prevention order"'10 3 that bear
not only on the safety of the protected party, but also on child
custody, visitation, and child support. Indeed, given the many
forms of relief that protection orders provide, including financial
awards and property possession, to name only two, the order
may need to be modified several times. This need is especially
true in states where protection orders are of infinite duration.
Many traditional civil injunctions are subject to changing circumstances as well. The Supreme Court so recognized when it
revisited Swift in Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail,o4 the
most cited decision supporting a less onerous burden on a party
moving to modify an injunction. 10 5 The injunction at issue was
structural; it compelled the institutional reform of a jail by
prohibiting the double-celling of inmates and the housing of pre10 6
trial detainees.
Five years after issuance, when the court ordered the government to comply with the injunction or close the jail, the gov10 7
ernment entered into a consent decree to build a new jail.
When the government later asked for modification because of
construction delays, the trial court held that the government
failed to meet the grievous wrong showing required by Swift. 10 8
The Supreme Court held that a "less stringent, more flexible
standard" was permitted, as the Court's decisions since Swift reflect. 10 9 Particularly in institutional reform cases, in which decrees remain in place for significant periods of time, there is an
increased likelihood of facts and circumstances changing. 110 A
103. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 821 N.E.2d 79, 89 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005).
104. 502 U.S. 367 (1992).
105. The Supreme Court's later decision in Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540
U.S. 431 (2004), a case in which a plaintiff was enforcing a consent decree against
the state of Texas, cites Rufo as precedent for the proposition that a court's traditional equitable powers allow modification of consent decrees due to a change in
circumstances.
106. Id. at 373.
107. Id. at 374.
108. Id. at 376. Construction on the jail did not start until 1987, and in 1989 the
government moved to modify the consent decree to allow double ceiling of a subset
of inmates, on grounds that work on the jail was delayed and the inmate population
outpaced initial projections.
109. Id. at 380.
110. Id.
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more flexible test accommodated two other characteristics of institutional reform litigation: achieving the underlying goals of
the litigation, and serving the public interest."' The moving

party was not required to meet the grievous wrong test, but instead could obtain modification if it established a significant
change in fact or law, and after doing so, showed that the proposed modification was suitably tailored to the new
11 2
circumstances.
Since Rufo, lower courts have struggled to determine
whether this flexible test should be limited to structural injunctions that affect the public interest, or whether it also ought to
apply to private disputes affecting only the parties appearing in
the case.11 3 The circuits are split.1 1 4 Some apply the Rufo test to
all injunctions and consent decrees, regardless of the underlying
purpose of the law, while others limit Rufo's application to cases
involving the public interest, rather than private disputes." 5
Swift and Rufo articulate two distinct standards of law (or
one standard of law applicable to two widely disparate factual
situations) 116 applicable to the modification and vacatur of civil
injunctions. However in both cases, the restrained party, not the
protected party, moved for relief. Left unanswered is what bearing the identity of the moving party - protected, or restrained -

111. Id. at 381.
112. Id. at 384.
113. See Bernard T. Shen, From Jail to Cellular Communications: Should the
Rufo Standard Be Applied to Antitrust and Commercial Consent Decrees?, 90 Nw.
U.L. Rev. 1781, 1786 (1996).
114. Id. at 1816.
115. Id. at 1815-1829. The First and Third Circuits do something different. In
comparing Swift with Rufo, the First Circuit concluded that the two decisions did
not create a dichotomy, but a continuum, on which Swift is at one end and Rufo the
other: Swift applies to decrees "protecting rights fully accrued upon facts so nearly
permanent as to be substantially impervious to change" whereas Rufo applies to
decrees involving "the supervision of changing conduct or conditions and are thus
provisional and tentative." Alexis Lichine & Cie. v. Sacha A. Lichine Estate Selections, Ltd., 45 F.3d 582, 586 (1st Cir. 1995). The job of the court is to locate the case
before it on this continuum. Id. The Third Circuit has approved a "factor analysis"
similar to that of the First, in which each case must be evaluated according to the
particular sets of circumstances it presents, making one universal formula - either
Swift or Rufo - inapplicable. See Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. NLRB, 64 F.3d
880, 888 (3d Cir. 1995).
116. See Lichine, 45 F.3d at 586.
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has on the Court's analysis. 117 This distinction is critical to state

courts' treatment of victims who move for vacatur in CPO cases.
The Supreme Court shed some light on this question in
United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,118 another case
involving an unlawful monopoly, in which the plaintiff United

States government sought to tighten the restrictions on a defendant shoe manufacturer. The trial court read Swift to say that

even a plaintiff could not modify its injunction without a showing
that some unforeseen circumstance arising since the issuance of
the injunction had caused a grievous wrong. 119
The Supreme Court disagreed with this stringent reading of

Swift: "Swift teaches that a decree may be changed upon an appropriate showing, and it holds that it may not be changed in the
interests of the defendants if the purposes of the litigation as incorporated in the decree (the elimination of monopoly and re-

strictive practices) have not been fully achieved.' 120 The case
supports the proposition that a more flexible test applies when it
is the party protected by the injunction who seeks to modify its
terms. The flexible standard applies even when, as in United
Shoe, the plaintiff wishes to strengthen the order enjoining the
12 1
defendant.
No Supreme Court case sets forth a burden of proof for a
protected party's motion to modify its injunction to ease the bur-

dens imposed on the defendant, or to vacate its own injunction
entirely. 122 All tests, regardless of where they fall on the Swift to

Rufo continuum, contemplate only one of two scenarios: 1) the
protected party seeks to modify the conditions imposed on the

restrained party for the purpose of making the injunction more
restrictive (as in United Shoe), or 2) the restrained party seeks to
117. Because of the unlikelihood that a restrained party would challenge a protected party's motion to vacate, the Court's analysis of this issue is focused on modification of an injunction by the protected party, rather than vacatur.
118. 391 U.S. 244 (1968).
119. The trial court denied the plaintiff's motion, based on its reading of Swift as
limiting a court's power to modify an injunction to cases "involving '(1) a clear
showing of (2) a grievous wrong (3) evoked by new and unforeseen conditions."'
United Shoe, 391 U.S. at 247.
120. Id. at 248.
121. The Court distinguished Swift, a case in which "the defendants sought relief
not to achieve the purposes of the provisions of the decree, but to escape their impact," whereas in United Shoe, it was the plaintiff who made the motion, and did so
for the explicit purpose of achieving the goals of the initial decree. Id. at 249.
122. As discussed previously, such a case would likely be uncontested by the defendant, and the standard of law that applies (according to the federal courts) is
whether and how such a motion affects the public interest.
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vacate the order, or modify the conditions imposed, to make its
burden less onerous (as in Swift and Rufo). In both instances,
the protected party desires the continuance of the injunction.
If applying federal principles to CPO cases, and specifically
to the scenario where the victim moves to vacate and the batterer
does not contest, state court judges should defer to the victims'
wishes. Deference to the parties' wishes is the norm in uncontested motions, absent a finding that the public or a third party's
interest is at stake. Determining whether the public interest is
implicated in a given case requires the court to examine the underlying purpose of the law and the intent of the legislators, and
to construe the public interest accordingly.
When the public has an interest in the litigation, the court
weighs its interest against that of the named parties, who have
the burden of persuading the judge that either the public interest
is not implicated, or that if it is, the impact on the public is inconsequential. While federal law provides that courts of equity may
compel relief they might not otherwise in the name of the public
interest,12 3 it does not provide support for imposing a Swift like
burden of proof on the victim. Instead, if a test were justified in the name of the public interest - it must be flexible, taking into
account factors such as the likelihood of circumstances changing
during the pendency of the order; that the protection order is a
preventive, not structural or an institutional reform injunction;
that the moving party is the protected party, not the respondent;
and that the moving party seeks to terminate the burden on the
restrained party, not tighten it. The next section applies these
principles to the reasoning articulated by state judges when deciding motions for vacatur.
IV.

MODIFICATION AND VACATUR OF
CIVIL "PROTECTION ORDERS

Similar to federal doctrine, almost no state court opinions
discuss what burden of proof, if any, should be imposed on a protected party seeking vacatur. Because there are so few opinions,
this section focuses primarily on one jurisdiction, New Jersey, in
which two trial court decisions analyzing the specific scenario in
which a victim moved to vacate were, in fact, published. In one,
the judge deferred completely to the wishes of the victim, mirroring federal court analysis. In the other, the judge took the oppo123. See Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Fed., 300 U.S. 515 (1937).

UCLA WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 16:39

site approach, holding the victim to a Swift-like burden of proof
in denying her motion to vacate. This section reviews a handful
of other New Jersey decisions analyzing batterers' uncontested
and contested motions to vacate, showing how these analyses
mirror federal standards, and reviewing pertinent dicta addressing how much deference should be afforded victims' wishes.
The cases were decided in the years following major reforms
in New Jersey's civil and criminal court responses to domestic
violence. On the civil side, the state's Prevention of Domestic
Violence Act of 1990 was amended 124 and the New Jersey Attorney General and Supreme Court jointly issued a Domestic Violence Procedure Manual. The statute was amended to, among
other things, add language clarifying that the purpose of the act
was "to assure the victims of domestic violence the maximum
protection from abuse the law can provide. ' 125 A primary purpose of the Manual was to reaffirm the state's commitment to
vigorously enforce the protection order statute. 126 In the four
years prior to these reforms, batterers killed two victims of domestic violence. In both cases, CPOs were in effect and criminal
proceedings were pending. Both cases made headlines, and
12 7
judges' handling of the cases was sharply criticized.
A.

Uncontested Motions for Vacatur

1. When the Victim Moves to Vacate
In LJ. v. LS.,128 a case decided at the trial court level, the
victim moved to vacate her protection order because she no
longer feared the respondent and because he had proven himself
to be a good father to the parties' daughter.1 2 9 She testified that
he had been participating more in his daughter's life, paying child
support, working and "pulling his life together.' 130 The victim
mistakenly believed the protection order expired after one year.
When the parties resumed contact, the respondent was arrested
for violating the order.13 1 While he was incarcerated, the victim
§ 2C:25-17-35 (2005).
125. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-18 (2005).
126. See Lisa Memoli & Gina Plotino, Enforcement or Pretense: The Courts and
the Domestic Violence Act, 15 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 39, 45 (1993).
127. Id. at 126.
128. 744 A.2d 1246 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1999).
129. Id. at 1249.
130. Id. at 1289.
131. Id. at 1249.
124. N.J. STAT. ANN.
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moved to vacate to "get this matter straight so that he can go
1 32
home and continue working and doing the rite [sic] thing."'
Although there was no statutory provision specifically governing how the court should analyze a victim's motion, the general law set forth a "good cause" standard to be applied to a
restrained party's motion to vacate. 133 The court chose not to
apply that standard to the victim's motion. It reasoned that the
principles underlying the distinction between criminal and civil
actions necessitated the interpretation that petitioners in civil
cases must be afforded complete autonomy of decision-making.
The state's involvement in civil actions is usually limited to the
creation of procedures and remedies. The State normally is
not a participant in civil disputes . . . The dispute exists between the plaintiff and defendant, whereas the restraining order governs the future of the private relationship between
those two parties. While there may be a criminal element to a
domestic violence dispute, the action from which a restraining
order evolves is civil. If a plaintiff wishes to dissolve the restraining order, the Act requires no further justification from
plaintiff other than a showing that there is a lack of coercion,
voluntariness and that plaintiff understand the 'cycle of violence' 134and the consequences of dismissing a restraining
order.
In fact, the Act did not require an evidentiary showing by
the victim at all. When it stated that the plaintiff must show a
lack of coercion and an understanding of the consequences of
vacatur, the court referred to the Domestic Violence Procedure
Manual, not the statute. 135 The Manual set forth a specific procedure for state court judges when presented with a victim's motion to vacate: "The judge, after reviewing the file . . . should
reiterate to the victim the information given . . . by the domestic
violence staff person. If the judge thereafter is convinced that
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1250 (explaining N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29d provided: "Upon good
cause shown, any final order may be dissolved or modified upon application ... but
only if the judge who dissolves or modifies the order is the same judge who entered
the order, or has available a complete record of the hearing or hearings on which the
order was based.").
134. Id. at 1252. Similar to LJ. v. IS., in Tobkin v. Florida, 777 So.2d 1160, 1164
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001), a Florida appellate court held that the petitioner had a
right to voluntarily dismiss her temporary protection order. The court reasoned that
the protection order was a private action and thus the petitioner could terminate the
case as in any other civil action. Id. In fact, the appellate court found that the lower
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to continue the case without the petitioner's
participation. Id.
135. LJ. v. LS., 744 A.2d. at 1250.
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the request for withdrawal is an informed one and is not made
under duress, the withdrawal should be granted... ",136
Noting that the protection order statute had been amended
twice for the specific purpose of restricting the defendant's ability
to vacate, but added no language restricting the victim's ability to
do so, the court concluded that when read in light of the overall
policy behind the legislation - to give victims maximum protection - the legislature intended that there be no impediment in the
way of the victim when she chose to vacate.' 37 Nor did the legis138
lature intend the judiciary to create such an impediment.
The analysis conducted by the court in LJ. v. LS. mirrors
that conducted by federal courts hearing uncontested motions to
vacate civil injunctions. Federal courts defer to the parties'
wishes, so long as those wishes comport with the public interest. 139 The IJ. court examined the policy expressed in the substantive law underlying protection orders to determine whether
the statute was intended to resolve a matter between two individual litigants, like other private, civil causes of action, or if it had a
broader public impact.
The court first unequivocally concluded that the public was
not impacted, as it would be if the case were criminal. In the
criminal context, providing broad protection to a victim might
mean that the state has an interest in restricting her ability to
decide whether to terminate court orders designed to protect her.
In civil cases, in which only the parties to the litigation were affected, and specifically where the victim no longer sought the
court's intervention, providing "broad protection" meant something different. It meant that there should be no impediment
placed in the victim's way when she chooses to vacate her order.
The legislature made clear in the statute that the victim's decision
should be afforded complete deference, so long as that decision
was informed and made voluntarily.
In Stevenson v. Stevenson, 140 a trial court held the opposite.
The petitioner had been severely assaulted by the respondent in
the past, and he had a history of violence outside of the relationship. 141 At the hearing, the victim testified that she wanted the
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 1251.
Id.
Id. at 1252.
See United States v. W. Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283, 305 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
714 A.2d 986 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1998).
Id. at 993.
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order vacated because she had reconsidered her relationship with
the respondent and wanted him to be a part of their child's
life.' 42
The court denied the victim's motion, finding that she did
not prove good cause to vacate,1 43 the standard of law that the
court in IJ. v. LS. found inapposite to petitioners' motions for
vacatur. The Stevenson court reasoned that it must impose a burden of proof on the petitioner, rather than deferring to her
wishes, because she suffered from Battered Woman Syndrome.
"Plaintiff has gone through the battering cycle with defendant at
least twice. Through this dissolution request she seeks to remain
in the situation. She thus meets the definition of a 'battered woman.'"144 As a battered woman, the victim could not reasonably
145
assess what was in her best interest.
The court explained that if a victim is unable to make a decision in her best interest, it must look at the objective evidence in
the case and make a decision for her. 146 The purpose underlying
the state's protection order statute so required.
Without making an independent finding based on the objective evidence, a court does not meet the public policy dictates
of the Act that victims of domestic violence must be assured
the maximum protection from abuse the law can provide; that
the official response to domestic violence, including that of the
courts, shall communicate the attitude that domestic violent
behavior will not be excused or tolerated; and that it is the
responsibility of the courts to protect victims of domestic violence by ordering those remedies and sanctions that are4availa7
ble to assure the safety of the victims and the public.'
The court held that "given the uncontroverted evidence of
defendant's brutality against his wife, his history of violence both
within and without the domestic arena, his alcohol abuse and uncontrolled assaultive behavior when under the influence, and the
reports before the court... a reasonable, objective and independent determination of the facts leads to the inescapable conclusion that a real threat of recurrence of domestic violence by
defendant upon his battered wife will exist" if the order was
48
vacated.1
142. Id. at 989-90.
143. Id. at 995.
144. Id. at 993.
145. Id.

146. Id. at 994.
147. Id.

148. Id. at 995.
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Reflective of federal court analysis, the judge in Stevenson
chose not to defer to the petitioner's wish to vacate because it
found that the policy underlying the protection order statute dictated otherwise. This conclusion was not insupportable. In fact,
New Jersey's Domestic Violence ProcedureManual quoted by J.
v. I.S. was on point. It explicitly provided that the court must be

assured that the victim, in moving to vacate, was acting voluntarily and that she understood the cycle of violence. Based on the

same facts from which it found that the victim, as a "battered
woman," was incapable of making a decision in her own interest, 149 Stevenson could have denied the motion in accordance
150
with the Manual.
Instead, the Stevenson court undertook a flawed analysis to

justify application of the most stringent burden of proof to the
victim's motion. Examining principles applied by federal courts,
even in contested motions to vacate, and even when it is the restrained party who files the motion rather than the protected
party, illustrates the court's stretch in logic.
Assuming for the sake of argument that a federal court
found, as did Stevenson, that the public interest required an uncontested motion for vacatur to be analyzed, as would a contested motion to vacate, it would look to the standards set forth
in Swift, Rufo and United Shoe in determining what specific test
for vacatur to apply. United Shoe instructs that the protected

party's burden - even when attempting to make an injunction
more onerous on the defendant - must be less stringent than that
imposed on the restrained party. 15 1 Stevenson does not comport.
149. Id.
150. It should be noted that determining whether a victim of domestic violence
has been coerced to drop her order is a formidable task. For years, feminist scholars
and activists, including (to name but a few) Susan Schechter, Barbara Hart, Martha
Mohoney, and Evan Stark, have recognized the centrality of coercion in domestic
violence. Batterer treatment programs grounded in feminist theory do the same.
All agree that coercion is a key element, if not the fundamental element, that distinguishes domestic violence from other forms of violence between partners in relationships. Yet almost no empirical studies have measured coercion, and even advocates
for domestic violence have not been in agreement on its definition. See Mary Ann
Dutton & Lisa Goodman, Coercion in Intimate Partner Violence: Toward a New
Conceptualization,52 SEx ROLES (2005). The enormously challenging task of measuring coercion in the context of vacating civil protection orders when victims so
request is beyond the scope of this article, but the subject of a work in progress by
this author.
151. A minority of courts have read United Shoe more narrowly. See Jost, supra
note 60, at n. 84. Although United Shoe explicitly states that the identity of the
moving party - plaintiff or defendant - is crucial, it does so in the context of a
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The court explicitly stated that policy required it to impose the
same standard of law on the victim as it would on the restrained
party, even in the circumstance in which the victim sought to
loosen - indeed, terminate - rather than tighten the restrictions
imposed on the respondent.
The next step in the federal court analysis would be to determine what standard - a Swift grievous wrong test, or a more flexible Rufo test - would apply. Stevenson applied a Swift-like test.
In requiring the victim to prove the nonexistence of even a threat
of recurrence of domestic violence, 152 it imposed the very heavy
burden articulated by Justice Cardozo: showing that "dangers,
once substantial, have become attenuated to a shadow. 1 53 Be154
cause the court discredited the victim as a "battered woman,"
she could not meet the very high burden of proof imposed on

her.
Recently the Appeals Court of Massachusetts analyzed
whether the Swift or the Rufo test applied to a batterer's motion
to vacate a CPO. In Mitchell v. Mitchell,155 the court found that
Swift's grievous wrong test was inapposite. It found that "myriad
circumstances" arise during the pendency of a CPO, requiring a
flexible approach to vacatur. 156 The court situated CPOs on a
continuum between Swift's "facts impervious to change" 157 and
plaintiff seeking to effectuate the underlying decree, not vacate it. Given that the
Court explicitly noted that the plaintiffs motive for modification was to enforce the
initial decree, the case could be interpreted as authority for the proposition that
victims seeking to vacate their civil protection orders must prove that the underlying
goal of the initial protection order has been achieved.
Accordingly, if a victim of domestic violence testified that the batterer had not
contacted her since the initial order was issued, that she no longer feared him (and
that this lack of fear was reasonable), that he had complied with all provisions of the
order and that there was no risk to her safety, the court could find that the underlying purposes of the order were achieved and hence vacate it. However, in Stevenson, the court found that the order had not accomplished its goals. Since its
issuance, the batterer had attempted to contact the victim and had failed to attend
counseling. Stevenson's assessment that the underlying protection order had not
achieved its primary purposes may have been correct, if the primary purpose of the
order was defined by the judge, rather than by the victim.
To the extent that this conclusion was accurate, and to the extent that United
Shoe is interpreted as a minority of federal courts do, in accordance with federal
civil injunction doctrine the motion to vacate should be analyzed under the same
standard of law as would a restrained party's motion.
152. See Stevenson, 714 A.2d at 995.
153. See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 118 (1932).
154. See Stevenson, 714 A.2d at 993.
155. See Mitchell v. Mitchell, 821 N.E.2d 79, 89 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005).
156. Id. at 89.
157. See Swift, 286 U.S. at 106.
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Rufo's "changing conduct or conditions that are thus provisional
and tentative"' 58 and devised a flexible, factor test, akin to that
adopted by the First Circuit. 159
The Mitchell court made explicit, however, that even this
standard of law would not be applied to a petitioner's motion to
vacate her order. 160 Though the court did not discuss what standard of law it would apply, both the text of the decision and state
judicial policies governing domestic violence cases lead to the
conclusion that the burden on the victim would have been less
1 61
onerous, not more, than its newly created flexible test.
Why did the Stevenson court impose such an onerous, Swiftlike burden on the victim? One explanation is that it did so to
reach the result it wanted: to make the point that this victim, as a
battered woman, was not capable of making a rational decision
on her own.
The opinion is replete with statements, both explicit and implicit, indicating that the court did not find the victim, in asking
that the order be lifted, was acting as a reasonable person.
Whether or not this plaintiff would agree, it is clear that from
the standpoint of objective fear, that a reasonable victim of
such a brutal beating by a husband, who has assaulted her in
the past and has a history of other violent behavior, and is the
subject of experts' findings of uncontrolled anger and excessive use of alcohol, would have a reasonable fear that future
violence by her
husband would occur, were the restraining or162
der dissolved.
158. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992).
159. See supra Section IVC and accompanying notes.
160. See Mitchell, 821 N.E.2d at 87, n.14: "This opinion does not address the
circumstances in which the parties jointly seek an application to terminate the
order."
161. See, e.g., Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Guidelinesfor Judicial Practice:
Abuse Prevention Proceedings Guidelines, http://www.mass.gov/courts/formsand
guidelines/domestic/dvg5.html#5.08 ("[A] plaintiff who wishes to terminate the order should be permitted to do so, regardless of the reason given or the presence of
children.") [hereinafter Massachusetts Guidelines for Judicial Practice]. The Commentary to Guideline 5:08 further provides: "The courts alone cannot protect a victim of family violence from an abuser who is undeterred by the threat of arrest or
incarceration. A victim of such abuse is in the best position to decide what course of
action will provide more safety. At a given time, a restraining order might exacerbate the plaintiff's danger. Thus, the plaintiff's decision to vacate an order must be
respected." Id.
162. See Stevenson v. Stevenson, 714 A.2d 986, 994 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1998) (emphasis in original). The court further stated that the defendant's perceived
control over the victim "may attenuate the victim's ability to act in the best interest
of the children. Moreover, fear might attenuate the ability of the victim to act in his
or her own best interests." Id.
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The court began its application of the law with the statement
Plaintiff's dissolution request, made despite the latest brutal
beating she suffered at the hands of a drunken husband who
has a past history of wife-beating and an alcohol abuse problem, is consistent with phase three of 'the battered woman's
syndrome'.... 163
[Petitioner] thus meets the definition of a 'battered woman.'
Use of the label "battered woman" to describe a victim of
domestic violence is controversial. Feminist scholars argue that it
reduces the victim to a stereotype, while simultaneously de-emphasizing the conduct of the batterer. As summarized by Professor Elizabeth Schneider,
In contrast with other descriptions of harm to women, "battered woman" describes the victim and focuses on her qualities. A woman is or is not a 'battered woman.' The phrase is
reductive in that it implies the total life experience of the particular woman: a 'battered woman.'" 64
The Stevenson court not only viewed the victim as a "battered woman," but also found that she suffered from Battered
Woman Syndrome. Professor Schneider further observes,
Public experience of the term "battered woman" has been
shaped by association with the concept of "battered woman
syndrome" . . . which has been commonly understood to define battered women as suffering from a kind of helplessness
that renders them incapable of leaving their batterers. Thus,
the term "battered woman" conjures up images of1 65helplessness and defeat rather than survival and resistance.
It is within this framework that the court in Stevenson analyzed the victim's motion to vacate. The first paragraph of the
opinion implies that the victim must have wanted to be abused:
"Plaintiff has gone through the battering cycle with defendant at
least twice. Through this dissolution request she seeks to remain
in the situation."'1 66 This statement encapsulates the view of the
court throughout the opinion.
It also reveals the challenges faced by judges hearing CPO
cases, as compared to federal court judges hearing traditional
civil injunctions. First, judges often misinterpret victim behavior
due to a lack of understanding of the psychological trauma induced by extended abuse. 167 Survivors of prolonged or severe
163. Id. at 993.

164.

SCHNEIDER, supra note 5, at 61-62.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See Epstein, supra note 22, at 40.
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domestic violence often exhibit some symptoms or meet the full
diagnostic criteria for post-traumatic stress disorder. 168 As one
example, a symptom such as dissociation may cause victims to
testify about emotionally charged incidents with an entirely flat
169
affect.
Because these psychological phenomena may differ greatly
from the behavior and demeanor that a judge encounters with
other witnesses, they often are incorrectly interpreted as indications of lack of credibility. 170 Women who appear to change their
stories over time about the abuse are particularly likely to be discredited. In the context of vacating protection orders, where victims have had time to reflect on the abuse since initially telling
the story to the judge, this problem may be compounded. The
very fact of change may be used as evidence that the changed
stories cannot possibly be true.' 7' But victims frequently have
exactly this response: they repress what happened; they cannot
speak; they hesitate, waver and procrastinate; they hope the
abuse will go away; they cover up for their abusers; they try
harder to be "good" girls and they take the blame for the abuse
172
upon themselves.
Even victims' lawyers have suggested that victims' testimony
be questioned: a woman's testimony "should be accorded great
deference when [the victim] wants the law to take action against
the batterer, but should be given less weight when [the victim]
says she wants to protect him."' 173 Because a victim "is far more
likely to minimize her husband's brutality than exaggerate it...
[she has] more credibility when she is making charges against
174
him than when she is refusing to complain."'
When compared with traditional civil injunctions, credibility
of the protected party is a challenge unique to CPOs that may
skew judicial decision-making. Additionally, judges may feel
frustrated with victims for several reasons. First, they may feel
that victims are not telling the truth. The same victims may come
into court repeatedly to obtain a protection order, only to vacate
it later. Judges may lack information about the dynamics of do168. Id.
169. Id. at 41.
170. Id.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. Kathleen Waits, The CriminalJustice System's Response to Battering: Understanding the Problem, Forging the Solutions, 60 WASH. L. REV. 267, 307 (1985).
174. Id.
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mestic violence, and like the court in Stevenson, perceive victims
175
as refusing to leave the abuse.
Judges also feel frustrated with batterers. The Stevenson
opinion revealed this to be true. It called the batterer "a
drunken husband" who committed a "brutal battering" and who
could "savage" the victim again. 176 The court found that the respondent "flouted" the order. 177 It concluded: "This court will
not be an accomplice to further violence by this defendant, by
wholly dissolving at this point the restraints that have been en1 78
tered against him."'
In Stevenson, the judge's frustration seemed to include how
to handle the issue of domestic violence as a whole. Judges hearing protection order cases often fear that no matter what they do,
or do not do, a batterer will commit more violence. 179 In this
way, judges (and advocates, social workers and attorneys) indirectly experience the double binds under which many women negotiate their daily lives. 180 James Ptacek describes this dilemma
as "emotional blackmail": by empathizing with the victim, the
judge indirectly feels the batterer's threat and fears that providing the woman with assistance may further endanger her. 18'
Such fear may skew decision-making. Judges making predictions of future violence receive highly negative feedback when
they predict an individual will not be violent and that individual
is later violent. 182 In contrast, they receive far less negative feedback when they predicted an individual would be dangerous but
that individual was not, in fact, later dangerous. 183 The differential in feedback biases decision-making in the direction of predictions that the individual in question will be violent, even in cases
84
in which the decision-maker actually remains uncertain.'
175. Deborah Epstein, ProceduralJustice: Tempering the State's Response to Domestic Violence, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1843, 1865 (2002).
176. Stevenson v. Stevenson, 714 A.2d 986, 993 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1998).
The court reiterated that the case involved the commission of "the vicious beating of
a woman by her husband during a drunken rage." Id. at 994.
177. Id. at 989.
178. Id. at 995.
179.

JAMES PTACEK, BATTERED WOMEN IN THE COURTROOM: THE POWER OF

JUDICIAL RESPONSES

14 (1999).

180. Id. at 63.
181. Id.
182. Bruce J. Winick, Applying the Law Therapeutically in Domestic Violence
Cases, 69 UMKC L. REV. 33, 45 (2000).
183. Id. at 46.
184. Id.
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The feedback is often delivered publicly. This intensifies the
political pressure on judges. Particularly in the context of domestic violence, men's violence toward women is more public than
ever185 and judges' decisions in domestic violence cases are consequently becoming increasingly public. New Jersey courts handling domestic violence cases were publicly criticized in the years
18 6
prior to Stevenson.

Seeing hundreds of abused women each year in protection
order hearings and reading the daily news, judges may fear the
potential consequences of making a mistake. "No judge wants to
be the one who didn't grant a restraining order to the woman
found face down in the morning.' 87 Likewise, in the vacate posture, no judge wants to be the one who vacated a woman's order,
only to be greeted the next day with news of the same fatal
result. 188
Such a result dramatically emphasizes the challenges unique
to CPOs that may skew judicial decision-making, especially when
that decision-making is compared to federal court judges' in
traditional civil injunction cases. But when comparing LJ.v. LS.
and Stevenson, both CPO cases relying on the same underlying
public policy in their analyses, and both facing the same challenges unique to domestic violence litigation, their reasoning and
holdings greatly diverged. LJ.v. LS.concluded that what the legislature meant when it directed the court to provide maximum
protection to the victim was that it should defer to her decision
and assure that no restriction be imposed upon her ability to vacate. In contrast, Stevenson interpreted the same policy as requiring the most restrictive burden of proof before terminating
the victim's order - that which would be imposed upon a batterer
filing the motion.
Though the New Jersey Appellate Division has not spoken
to the issue of how a victim's motion to vacate should be analyzed, it has discussed the significance placed on a victim's con185. PTACEK, supra note 179, at 67.

186. Memoli & Plotino, supra note 126, at 45.
187. PTACEK, supra note 179, at 6.

188. Id. at 60. James Ptacek interviewed judges regarding the onslaught of media
coverage by the Boston Globe after the murder of woman by her husband in 1986.
One judge stated that media attention created a "sea change" on the bench in terms

of the attitudes of judges with regard to domestic violence cases; another made clear
that judges' motivation to do a good job in domestic violence cases is the knowledge
that it would come back to haunt him in the press. Id.
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sent to a batterer's motion to vacate, the next best analogous
situation.
2.

When the Batterer Moves to Vacate (with Victim Consent)

Sweeney v. Honachefsky' 89 was the first appellate decision
regarding analysis of motions to vacate after the amendment to
New Jersey's statute and promulgation of its Manual. In Sweeney, the victim consented to the batterer's motion to vacate. She
testified that she was reassured by the fact that the respondent
completed anger management, that she wanted to get on with her
life, and that she wanted no further involvement in any court
procedures. The court was satisfied that her testimony amounted
to consent, and found nothing in the record showing any risk to
the victim if the order was vacated. 19° Instead, the court focused
on prejudice to the respondent if the order remained in effect.
Finding that he would be severely prejudiced, the court vacated,
191
stating: "That, in our view, is what good cause is all about."
Sweeney raised the critical issue of due process for the restrained party. Though it is true that when courts find the public
interest is implicated, they may compel relief they might not otherwise compel, what effect does continuing a protection order
that the victim no longer wants have on the batterer? In the context of temporary injunctions, courts grant plaintiffs' motions to
dismiss so long as the defendant is not prejudiced. 192 It is the
restrained party's rights, rather than the victim's, that are
protected.
The erosion of due process rights for batterers in both the
criminal and civil systems is problematic not only on a theoretical
level, but also a pragmatic one. Professor Deborah Epstein convincingly argued that less procedural due process for batterers
may, in fact, decrease victims' safety. 193 Social science data confirms that process counts. 194 Litigants, who feel as though they
have been treated fairly, even when the results of a court's decision were not what they had hoped for, feel more satisfied with
the court system. 195 In turn, they are more likely to obey or189. Sweeney v. Honachefsky, 712 A.2d 1274 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998).
190. Id. at 1277.
191. Id.
192. FED. R. Civ. P. 41.
193. Epstein, supra note 175.
194. Id. at 1875, citing ToM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 3-4 (1990).
195. Id. at 1846. Professor Epstein states that social science research regarding
why people obey the law indicates that "the likelihood of a person's compliance with
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ders. 196 Batterers, who feel that they have been treated poorly,
or have not been heard, may be more likely to disobey the mandates of orders issued against them. This may be particularly
true when, as in LJ. v. LS., the victim has consented to contact
with the batterer and wants to continue a relationship with him.
When a court departs from the principle of deference to the
parties in uncontested motions, it risks that both parties may feel
as though they have been treated unfairly. 197 When refusing to
defer, the judge must choose some other standard of law to apply. If that standard is unjustifiably onerous, the risk that the
parties feel poorly treated is that much greater. This discussion
turns next to the standards applied to batterers' contested motions to vacate, arguing that the law should not impose a higher
burden on the petitioner in an uncontested posture than that imposed on the restrained party in a contested case.
B.

Contested Motions for Vacatur

After the amendment to New Jersey's CPO statute in 1991,
several published opinions analyzed batterers' contested motions
to vacate.1 98 In the leading case, Carfagno v. Carfagno,199 the
court emphasized the primacy of the wish of the victim to continue or vacate her protection order. The respondent moved for
vacatur, alleging there had been no further incidents between the
parties in over a year, that the petitioner no longer needed the
order, and that she opposed the motion to vacate in bad faith to
prevent him from obtaining employment with a local police
20 0
department.
The court first noted that New Jersey's statute provided that
an order could be vacated for good cause shown, but that no decisions had been published applying that standard. 20 1 It then
the dictates of police and probation officers, or with court orders issued in civil or
criminal cases, is at least as firmly rooted in his perception of fair process as in his
satisfaction with the ultimate result" and that as a result, advocates for victims of
domestic violence, in crafting a long term strategy for victim safety, must not lose
sight of the procedural rights of batterers.
196. Id. at 1875-76.
197. As Professor Epstein points out, victims who feel that the court treated
them fairly will be more likely to access the court in the future. Id.
198. See, e.g., Torres v. Lancellotti, 607 A.2d 1375 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1992);
Carfagno v. Carfagno, 672 A.2d 751 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1995); Kanaszka v.
Kunen, 713 A.2d 565 (N.J. App. Div. 1998).
199. 672 A.2d at 757.
200. Id. at 755.
201. Id. at 756.
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crafted a "framework of legal analysis" by delineating eleven factors for courts to consider when presented with a defendant's
motion to vacate.2 0 2 It placed victim consent at the top of the
list.203 In fact, it stated that this factor was dispositive.2 04
Although presented a batterer's motion to vacate, Carfagno
reached its conclusion that victim consent was dispositive by first
examining what the legislature intended with regard to victims'
motions to vacate.
The Legislature intended that the courts should follow the victim's request to dissolve a domestic violence order or dismiss a
domestic violence complaint without further legal analysis.
When construing a statute, the court must follow the legislative intent, considering the policy underlying the statute...
The policy of the Act is to provide broad protection for the
victim. The court notes that the Legislature provided that a
restraining order would be a civil remedy, and that the victim
- not the state - files the complaint to obtain the restraining

order... Thus, when looking at the entire Act, the court concludes that the Legislature intended to provide broad protection to the victim.
If judges disregard the victim's wishes in determining whether
to dismiss a complaint or dissolve a restraining order on the
victim's request, this has the effect of discouraging victims
from filing complaints when necessary. If the victim perceives
that the courts would not be responsive to their [sic] request to
dismiss the action, that victim or other victims may refrain
from filing a domestic violence complaint in the future. Certainly, this is not what the Legislature intended (citations
205
omitted).
If the legislature intended that the victim's wishes be
respected when she moves the court for vacatur, it must also intend that her wishes be respected when the respondent so moves.
In Carfagno, the victim opposed vacatur. But had she consented,
the court would have granted the defendant's motion to vacate
without further legal inquiry. This standard of law and analysis
reflects that of federal courts deciding uncontested motions.
Carfagno's application of a factor test to the respondent's
motion to vacate also mirrors federal court analyses of contested
motions made by the restrained party. The test falls somewhere
202. Id. at 756-57.
203. Id. at 757.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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between Swift's "grievous wrong" standard and Rufo's "less
'20 6
stringent, more flexible standard.
To accomplish the goal of protecting the victim, courts should
consider a number of factors when determining whether good
cause has been shown that the final restraining order should
be dissolved upon request of the defendant: (1) whether the
victim consented to lift the restraining order; (2) whether the
victim fears the defendant; (3) the nature of the relationship
between the parties today; (4) the number of times that the
defendant has been convicted of contempt for violating the order; (5) whether the defendant has a continuing involvement
with drug or alcohol abuse; (6) whether the defendant has
been involved in other violent acts with other persons; (7)
whether the defendant has engaged in counseling; (8) the age
and health of the defendant; (9) whether the victim is acting in
good faith when opposing the defendant's request; (10)
whether another jurisdiction has entered a restraining order
protecting the victim from the defendant;
and (11) other fac20 7
tors deemed relevant by the court.
Upon applying this test to the batterer's motion to vacate,
the court held that the respondent did not prove good cause to
20 8
vacate and denied his motion.
The divergence of statutory and policy interpretations within
the same jurisdiction reflects the tension between respecting autonomy and protecting victims that motions to vacate protection
orders present. On one end of a continuum are those courts that
defer to the victim's wish to vacate, allowing them complete autonomy of decision making.20 9 Recognizing their status as civil
litigants, and specifically, their status as petitioners in civil cases,
these courts have made clear that it would be inappropriate to
analyze petitioners' uncontested motions to vacate as they would
restrained parties'. In so doing, these courts reasoned that disregard for victims' wishes would not only be contrary to the public
policy underlying the statute, but may even put victims at risk
because it would deter them from seeking help from the courts
when they needed it.210
On the other end of the continuum are those courts that
deny a victim's motion to vacate unless she proves through objective evidence that the order is no longer necessary for her protec206. Id.
207. Id. at 756-57.
208. Id. at 760.
209. I.J. v. I.S., 744 A.2d 1246 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1999); Torres v. Lancellotti, 607 A.2d 1375 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1992); Carfagno, 672 A.2d at 751.
210. Carfagno, 672 A.2d at 757.
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tion.211 Despite the fact that the motion was uncontested and
that the movant was the petitioner, the Stevenson court held her
to the same standard it would use to analyze a batterer's contested motion to vacate, justifying its holding through the same
public policy: if the court is to convey that it takes domestic violence seriously, it must apply the law equally to victims and
respondents.
Does the public have an interest in the outcome of CPOs
independent of the desire of the victim? If so, what is that interest? Is it to treat male intimate violence against women as a
crime, thereby requiring judges to maintain CPOs against victims' wishes, or does some other judicial action better serve the
public interest? The next section addresses these questions.
V.

SHOULD THE PUBLIC AND THIRD PARTIES' INTERESTS
TRUMP THE VICTIM'S IN

CPO

CASES?

This section explores whether the public's undifferentiated
interest in preventing domestic violence is implicated in the specific context of vacatur of an individual victim's CPO. It recognizes the enormous impact of domestic violence on society,
which finds expression in CPO policy and legislation. Yet neither
battered women's activists who drafted CPO laws, nor the legislators who passed them, expressed a clear desire that the public's
interest trump that of the individual victim's when she, as a plaintiff in a civil lawsuit, chooses to halt the litigation. While acknowledging that a public interest argument could be relevant to
CPOs, this section asserts that this interest neither requires, nor
is best served by, judges' departure from the long-established
principle of deference to the parties' wishes. Instead, it argues
that deferring to a victim's wish to vacate more effectively accomplishes the important public policy goal of providing maximum protection to the victim, precisely because it promotes her
autonomy.
The argument recognizes one exception, in accordance with
federal doctrine regarding vacatur. When children, third parties
directly affected by the protection order, are in imminent danger,
their interests may trump that of the individual victim's. Even in
this circumstance, however, judges may be able to tailor the or211. See Kanaszka v. Kunen, 713 A.2d 565 (N.J. App. Div. 1998); Stevenson v.
Stevenson, 714 A.2d 986 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1998).
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der both temporally and substantively to support the autonomy
of victims' decision making in this private right of action.
A.

Is the Public Interest Implicated in CPOs?

As discussed extensively in Part II, to determine whether vacatur of an injunction implicates the public interest, federal
courts look to the stated purpose of the law underlying the injunction 212 to ascertain whether the injunction involves the settlement of a private controversy or a matter with more
2 13
appreciable consequences to the public.
1. The Purposes Underlying CPO Statutes
The Stevenson decision, discussed at length above, began by
quoting the preamble of the New Jersey's Prevention of Domestic Violence Act:
The Legislature finds and declares that domestic violence is a
serious crime against society; that there are thousands of persons in this State who are regularly beaten, tortured and in
some cases even killed by their spouses and cohabitants; that a
significant number of women who are assaulted are pregnant;
that victims of domestic violence come from all social and economic backgrounds and ethnic groups; that there is a positive
correlation between spousal abuse and child abuse; and that
children, even when they are not themselves physically assaulted, suffer deep and lasting emotional effects from exposure to domestic violence. It is therefore the intent of the
Legislature to assure the victims of domestic violence
the maximum protection from abuse the law can provide. 2 14
Several states' CPO statutes express a similar concern for
the safety of not just the victims who are the parties to the proceedings, but for the public as well. 2 15 For example, in Arkansas,
the CPO statute states:
The General Assembly hereby finds that this chapter is
necessary to secure important governmental interests in the
protection of victims of abuse and the prevention of further
abuse through the removal of offenders from the household
212. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992); Duran v.
Elrod, 760 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1985); New York State Assn. for Retarded Children,
Inc. v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956, 969 (2d Cir. 1983).
213. See Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Fed., 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937).
214. Stevenson, 714 A.2d at 992 (citation omitted).
215. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-101(1); FLA. STAT. § 741.2902; IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 39-6302; 750; ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/102; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §46:2131; ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19A §4001; NEB. REV. STAT. § 49-902; W. VA. CODE § 48-27101.
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and other injunctive relief for which there is no adequate remedy in current law. The General Assembly hereby finds that
this chapter shall meet a compelling societal need and is necessary to correct the acute and pervasive problem
of violence
2 16
and abuse within the households in this state.
Characterization of domestic violence as a "pervasive problem" affecting households across the state signifies the legislature's intent that domestic violence be considered a serious
problem, affecting more than the two people involved in the intimate relationship. Describing the protection of victims as both a
matter of governmental interest and as a "compelling societal
need" reinforces this view. When interpreting such policy, it is
reasonable for judges to conclude that the legislature intended
CPOs to protect not just the individual parties named in the case,
but the public at large.
However, in NAACP v. Federal Power Commission, 17 the
Supreme Court warned that protection of the general welfare is
not sufficient language in a regulatory statute to implicate the
public interest. 21 8 The Court explained that to give content and
meaning to the public interest mentioned in the statute, one must
look to the principal purpose for which the statute was
adopted.2 1 9 Though a number of states' CPO statutes provide
that domestic violence is a crime affecting society as a whole, this
language may be symbolic, rather than literal. The language
symbolizes the states' changed perception of domestic violence
as a serious problem, deserving of a serious governmental
response.
Close examination of these statutes reveals that legislators
intended for courts to protect victims by treating them as civil
litigants, rather than victim-witnesses, as they are treated in criminal cases. Most states' protection order statutes explicitly state
that CPOs are a remedy in addition to, and not precluded by, the
220
criminal prosecution of the batterer for the conduct at issue.
For example, the District of Columbia Intrafamily Offenses Act
states that the "institution of criminal charges ... shall be in addition to, and shall not affect the rights of the complainant to seek
216. ARK. CODE ANN.
217. 425 U.S. at 666.
218. Id.
219. Id.

§

9-15-101.

220. See, e.g. ALA. CODE

(2004);

ARK. CODE ANN.

§ 30-5-4(c) (2005); ALASKA STAT. §18.66.130(e)

§9-15-201 (2002).
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any other relief under this subchapter. '2 21 The legislative history
provides further clarification. The Intrafamily Offenses Act "was
intended to provide family members with access to special court
remedies without interposing criminal sanction in the family circle," 2 2 2 and further states that "criminal sanctions should not be
the only avenue for correcting such abuses, because ... threats to
the long-term stability of the family or home may arise in the
'223
seeking of criminal sanctions.
A number of states' CPO statutes provide victims with the
choice of pursuing a civil remedy in addition to criminal prosecution. These provisions indicate the legislatures' understanding of
the differences between the criminal and civil justice systems' responses to domestic violence. Legislators intended that victims
have the benefit of both. Recommendations made at the national
level reflect the same intention. In a well-known study funded by
the U.S. Department of Justice, Peter Finn and Sarah Colson
found that CPOs can provide "a workable alternative to criminal
charges or an additional remedy for many victims seeking protec'224
tion from further domestic abuse.
Policy makers and drafters of protection order legislation
were aware that the criminal justice response may not consider
the victim's wishes with regard to arrest and prosecution of the
batterer, and consequently may cause turmoil in the lives of the
victim and her family. CPOs, on the other hand, could provide
greater control, flexibility and autonomy for the individual victim. Drafters of CPO legislation had these precise purposes in
mind when they lobbied for both civil and criminal legal reme225
dies for victims.
Historically, violence in the home was considered a family
matter in which the state should not intervene. 226 In the 1970s,
the Battered Women's Movement defined the problem of "wife
abuse" in much broader terms. 227 First, activists recast it as a
public problem, not just a private harm. In conjunction with this
recharacterization of the problem as a public issue, the definition
221.
222.
223.
224.
search
pdf.
225.

D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1002(c) (2001).
DC Council Report, supra note 17, at 4.
Id. at 10.
National Institute of Justice, "Legal Interventions in Family Violence: ReFindings and Policy Implications", available at www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/171666.

Hart, supra note 32, at 23.
SCHNEIDER, supra note 5, at 13-23.
227. Id. at 22.
226.
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of wife abuse, which activists renamed "battering," included not
just the acts of physical violence perpetrated by one man against
one woman in an intimate relationship, but the broader social
22 8
and political contexts within which the violence occurred.
An important piece of this recharacterization was persuading the state to view domestic violence as a crime. Consequently,
legal reform within the criminal justice system became a priority
for activists. Activists wanted more, and appropriate, state intervention. They wanted the state to take domestic violence
seriously.
Police, like the public, considered domestic violence to be a
private matter, and consequently failed to respond to "domestic
disturbance" calls. 22 9 Often by the time police arrived on the
230
scene, most incidents of domestic violence had already ended.
Police did not make arrests but separated the parties, taking one
of them on a walk around the block. 231 In fact, until the 1970s,
police were formally trained to "mediate" family disputes; of2 32
ficers counseled rather than arrested.
As with all allegations of violence to which police respond,
police had discretion to make an arrest without an arrest warrant
only if they had probable cause to believe that a felony occurred.
Or if they had probable cause to believe a misdemeanor occurred, they could arrest without a warrant if the offense was
committed in the presence of an officer. 233 Due to the aggressive
lobbying campaigns of battered women's advocates, a landmark
study funded by the National Institute of Justice in 1984 showing
that arrest was a deterrent to battering, and a recommendation of
the U.S. Attorney General's Office that states enact arrest
laws, 234 many state statutes now provide for warrantless arrests
228. Id.
229. G. Kristian Miccio, Notes from the Underground:Battered Women, the State,
and Conceptions of Accountability, 23 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 133, 157-59 (2000) (discussing congressional findings that police fail to respond adequately to calls concerning domestic violence).
230. Epstein, supra note 175, at 1851.
231. G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence,
and the Conservatization of the Battered Women's Movement, 42 Hous. L. REV. 237,

269 (2005).
232. SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND
STRUGGLES OF THE BATTERED WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 157, 161 (1982).
233. Epstein, supra note 175, at 1853.
234. Id. (describing the "Duluth experiment" that concluded that arrest of a
batterer was an effective deterrent to a crime of violence against the same woman.
Shortly thereafter, the U.S. Attorney General issued a report recommending arrest
in cases of misdemeanor domestic violence).

UCLA WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 16:39

in misdemeanor cases as well, 235 giving police much wider discretion than they have in crimes involving violence between
strangers.
At the same time that advocates lobbied for wider police
discretion in making warrantless arrests, 2 36 they lobbied for police to have less discretion in responding to calls alleging violations of CPOs. In all states, police are now statutorily required
to make an arrest when they have probable cause to believe a
237
violation of a CPO has occurred.
While battered women's advocates have been successful in
persuading the state to treat domestic violence as a crime, CPOs
are nonetheless civil remedies. 2 38 However, much of the criminal
justice system's overall response to domestic violence is focused
on CPOs. 2 39 This large-scale involvement of the criminal justice
system may cause judges to over-rely on criminal justice system
rationales - those of protecting not just the individual victim, but
society at large - when determining whether to grant or deny
victims' motions to vacate their CPOs.
In contrast to other types of civil injunctions, CPOs implicate the criminal justice system in a number of phases of this litigation, from the moment the order is issued through
enforcement of it. For example, unlike most civil lawsuits in
which the petitioner is responsible for the cost of filing the case
and for effecting service on the opposing party, in CPO cases,
there is no filing fee, and the state serves the order at its own
expense on the restrained party.
When either a temporary or permanent CPO has been issued, it is recorded in a central registry created and maintained
by the state for the purpose of making the order easily accessible
to police, thereby facilitating the process of enforcement. On the
235. Id. at n.42; Miccio, supra note 230, at n.2.
236. Miccio points out that not all advocates were in favor of mandatory arrests.
Id. at 265-67.
237. Hanna, supra note 9, at 1858.
238. They are issued in civil court. The civil rules of procedure apply. As in
other civil injunction litigation, the individual petitioner may obtain a temporary, ex
parte restraining order, and the respondent is entitled to notice and a hearing on the
merits if he objects to the order becoming permanent. The burden of proof is by a
preponderance of the evidence. The respondent is not entitled to court-appointed
counsel if he cannot afford to retain it privately, nor is he entitled to a jury trial.
None of the constitutional guarantees afforded defendants in criminal cases are provided to respondents in civil protection order cases.
239. ANDREW R. KLEIN, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

67 (2004).
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national level, the Federal Bureau of Investigation maintains a
data bank to increase the likelihood of enforcement of protection
2 40
orders across state lines.
Like other injunctions, protection orders may be enforced
via civil and criminal contempt. In addition, in a number of jurisdictions, violation of a CPO, in and of itself, constitutes a crime.
A restrained party may thus be subject not only to civil and criminal contempt, and to arrest and prosecution if the underlying act
constitutes a crime (such as assault), but also subject to the sepa241
rate criminal charge of violating a protection order.
When activists drafted CPO legislation, they were cognizant
of the distinct goals of the civil and criminal justice systems' responses to domestic violence. They knew that in addition to
criminal prosecution of batterers, victims needed easily accessible civil remedies that could be obtained on an emergency basis.242

They were aware that victims needed individualized relief

tailored to their particular needs, and that this relief must be far
more comprehensive than anything that could be obtained in a
criminal case. 243 Finally, advocates understood that victims
needed a civil remedy that would complement the reforms occurring in the criminal system. 244 Victims would need greater autonomy of decision making, given that the criminal response would
be to arrest and prosecute batterers, with or without the consent
or cooperation of victims.
Many battered women's activists were opposed to
mandatory interventions in the criminal justice system precisely
because they decreased victim input and discretion. In fact, feminist scholars and battered women's advocates have debated the
effectiveness of mandatory policies for the past fifteen years.
Two critical strands of this debate have included whether state
intervention into victims' lives actually makes them safer, and
whether such interventions intolerably sacrifice their
245
autonomy.
240. Id.
241. For example, if a restrained party threatens a petitioner via telephone, he
could be subject to four distinct actions: civil contempt, criminal contempt, misdemeanor or felony harassment, and misdemeanor violation of a protection order.
242. See Hart, supra note 32, at 23-24.
243. Id.

244. Id.
245. See infra Section V and accompanying notes for discussion of the debate
among feminist scholars and lawmakers regarding the efficacy of mandatory interventions in the criminal justice system.
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The longstanding debate regarding the effectiveness of
mandatory interventions underscores the careful consideration
by feminist lawmakers of the effects of decreasing victim autonomy in the criminal justice system. The drafters of CPO laws did
not intend that a "no-drop" policy, or any policy decreasing victim autonomy for the sake of the public at large, be applied to
victims' motions to vacate. If they had, the civil and criminal justice systems' responses to domestic violence would not complement, but would replicate, each other.
Fundamental distinctions between the overall goals of the
criminal system and the civil system also make this clear. Because protection orders are civil, private rights of action, victims
who file protection orders must by definition be afforded greater
autonomy of decision-making than victims who are witnesses in
criminal cases. The victim, not the state, is the "prosecuting"
party. The petitioner seeks a specific remedy, tailored to her
unique needs and circumstances, without regard for whether the
CPO will deter or punish the batterer - goals of the criminal jus2 46
tice system, and decidedly not goals of a civil injunction.
The characterization of domestic violence as a crime, the
quasi-criminal structure of CPOs and the extent to which the
criminal justice system has become involved in the enforcement
of orders blurs the distinction between the civil and criminal justice systems' responses to domestic violence. While this blurring
may justify a judge's consideration of the public interest in the
context of a victim's motion to vacate, it does not follow that the
public's interest should outweigh that of the individual litigant's,
particularly to the extent that the obscurity between civil and
criminal remedies is merely fallout, or an inadvertent consequence of the recharacterization of domestic violence as a crime,
rather than the explicit intent of the drafters of CPO statutes.
This article argues that when a judge decides to depart from the
long established principle of deference to a civil litigant's wishes,
she must have more than a generalized concern for the public to
do so, in accordance with federal doctrine regarding vacatur of
injunctions. General concern for the safety of the public ex-

246. Injunctions are meant to protect the victim, not punish the restrained party.
Civil protection orders have the same purpose. See, e.g., Carfagno v. Carfagno, 672
A.2d 751, 757 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1995) ("The Legislature intended to protect
the victims - not punish the person who committed the act of domestic violence.")
(citation omitted).
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pressed in broad public policy goals underlying CPO statutes
may not be enough.
2.

Who is Affected: Protection of Children

While it is arguable whether the public's interest is implicated in the context of vacating an individual victim's CPO, the
protection of children is, per se, a matter of public concern. Because CPOs frequently contain provisions regulating the conduct
of the batterer toward the victim's children, this discussion turns
to their interests.
Studies show that child abuse occurs most frequently in families where there is also marital or partner violence.2 47 Children
may be victims of intentional physical abuse, and they may be
accidentally injured if they are present during a violent incident,
especially if they intervene to protect the victim. In addition,
some data suggest that children who are exposed to, but not direct victims of, domestic violence may experience a variety of
2 48
negative developmental problems.
Because children living in violent homes may be at risk,
judges are always justified in considering their interests when determining whether to continue or to vacate a CPO. Indeed, when
judges are presented with evidence suggesting that children have
been physically abused, judges are not merely justified in protecting them, but have a legal obligation to do so. In all states,
judges are statutorily mandated to report the abuse of children to
the state's child protective services agency so that a full screening
and investigation can be conducted with regard to whether the
2 49
children are in imminent danger of harm.
Making a report is one thing; what happens in reality may be
something entirely different. Problems with the child protection
system have been well documented. 250 It is understandable, and
247.

PETER

G.

JAFFE, ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY

FOR SAFETY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

& DOMESTIC

VIOLENCE:

A

CALL

21-23 (2003).

248. Jeffrey L. Edleson, Should Childhood Exposure to Adult Domestic Violence
Be Defined as Child Maltreatmentunder the Law?, in PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM
DOMESTIC

VIOLENCE:

STRATEGIES FOR COMMUNITY

INTERVENTION

8 (Peter G.

Jaffe, Linda L. Baker & Alison J. Cunningham eds., 2004).
249. Whether children are actually protected when referred to child protection
services, and how child protection services treat battered women, are topics that
have been widely discussed in the literature and are beyond the scope of this article.
250. See generally Mary E. Becker, Double Binds Facing Mothers in Abusive
Families: Social Support Systems, Custody Outcomes, and Liability for Acts of
Others, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 13 (1995); Joan S. Meier, Domestic Violence,
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in accord with federal principles regarding the protection of third
parties' interests in determining whether to vacate injunctions,
that judges might decide to maintain an order of protection despite the petitioner's wishes to the contrary. If the court believes
the order will be effective at keeping the batterer away from the
child, it may decide that the child's interests supersede the
petitioner's.
Whether extension of a CPO against the wishes of the children's mother is an effective way to protect children presents a
more difficult question. In the context of the juvenile justice system's response to domestic violence, Professor Jeffrey Edleson
has emphasized the importance of the family's voluntary, rather
than forced, participation in early intervention services. 251 He
explains that for most children (those who are exposed to but not
in imminent danger as a consequence of domestic violence),
early interventions that focus on strengthening existing personal,
social and economic resources are effective, rather than referral
of the family to child protection services agencies 252 that are
under-funded and simply do not have the resources to effectively
25 3
help families.
Judges have options in addition to making a report to child
protective services, and beyond denying outright a victim's motion to vacate. For example, if the judge finds that the batterer
has abused the child, it could hold the batterer accountable,
rather than penalize the victim. A judge could both find the batterer in contempt for violating a provision of the order, and also
vacate the order, for example. Alternatively, the judge could
maintain the protection order for a finite period of time, rather
than denying the vacatur whole cloth, until assured that a child
protection services investigation was under way. The court could
vacate some provisions of the order, while leaving others intact.
For example, the judge could vacate the "no contact" provision
as it relates to the batterer's contact with the petitioner, while
leaving in place the provisions of the order relating to children.
For those cases in which children are exposed to, but not
victims of the violence, judges are faced with the challenge of
conducting a more extensive factual inquiry into the presence of
Child Custody, and Child Protection: Understanding Judicial Resistance and Imagining the Solutions, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 657 (2003).
251. Edleson, supra note 248.
252. Id.

253. Id. at 19.
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additional risk factors, before assuming that the children are in
danger. Even in the context of child protective services, how2 54
ever, Edleson cautions against forced intervention by the state.
Denying a victim's motion to vacate may be perceived as such,
and therefore not an effective intervention to decrease the risk to
the children. Instead, voluntary participation in programs - programs in which child protection and domestic violence advocates
collaborate to help women and children find safety and recover
from the trauma of the violence - must be an option. Edleson
notes that many battered women's shelters and community based
domestic violence programs have long been a resource for chil2 55
dren who have witnessed violence.
While risk of harm to children certainly justifies state court
judges' departure from the normal standard of deference to the
parties' wishes, the difficult question of whether the court should
depart from that standard re-emerges. Assuming that the judge
finds a risk of danger to the children, is denying the victim's motion to vacate an effective way to alleviate that risk? Or is supporting victim autonomy by deferring to her decision a more
effective strategy?
B.

Supporting Victim Autonomy Increases Victims' and
Children's Safety

Just as voluntary participation by families in domestic violence programs, rather than participation forced by the state, has
been recommended for cases in which children are exposed to
domestic violence,2 56 the same may be true in CPO cases. Deference to victims' autonomy of decision making is the rule in federal court doctrine regarding vacatur. It should be the rule in
CPO cases as well. But if judges in protection order cases defer
to victims' wishes, how can they simultaneously send the message, as public policy requires they must, that they do not tolerate men's violence against women?
James Ptacek argued that this question poses a crisis of judicial authority: if judges are seen as tolerating men's violence
against women, courts lose legitimacy. 2 57 Perhaps one way to address this concern could be to reframe the question itself. Perhaps, as the drafters of protection order legislation believed,
254. Id. at 21.
255. Id.

256. Id.
257. PrACEK, supra note 179, at 7.
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victim autonomy and safety are not at odds, but instead go hand
in hand.
Some research regarding the efficacy of mandatory interventions within the criminal justice system has borne out the link
between the victim's personal choice and her safety, requiring
policymakers to re-think criminal approaches. For example, in
one study, victims who voluntarily participated in the prosecution of the batterer were less at risk of further violence only if
they made a personal choice to participate, rather than being coerced into doing so. 258 Other research has shown that when victims feel that government officials listen and respond to their
individual needs, rather than dismiss them, they were more likely
to feel treated fairly and as a result to cooperate with
259
prosecutors.
Research regarding the effectiveness of CPOs is at its very
early stages. Of the research that exists, the findings are greatly
disparate, providing little conclusive evidence that protection orders are effective tools to stop further physical and psychological
2 60
abuse of women.
Victims who obtain orders already know this to be true.
Many victims, anticipating that the orders will not prevent reassault but will help them accomplish other goals, decide to obtain these orders nonetheless. 26 1 Empirical evidence supporting
this fact has led some feminist scholars to conclude that a protection order best serves to end domestic violence if it gives the woman a new sense of control over her own life. 262 To the extent
that judges do not vacate orders based solely on the fact that they
believe the orders will prevent future assault, they may be overly
reliant on the effectiveness of these orders, and underestimating
the value of the victim's feelings of personal choice and empowerment, and her particular goals in obtaining the order in the first
place.
258. David A. Ford & Mary Jean Regoli, The CriminalProsecution of Wife Assaulters: Process, Problems and Effects, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO WIFE ASSAULT:
CURRENT TRENDS AND EVALUATION 127, 157-60 (N. Zoe Hilton ed., 1993).
259. Edna Erez & Joanne Belknap, In Their Own Words: Battered Women's Assessment of the Criminal Processing System's Responses, 13 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS
251, 264 (1998).
260. DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 34, at 499.
261. See supra notes 35 and 36, discussing results of studies by Harrell & Smith
and Fisher & Rose.
262. Taff, supra note 27, at 169; DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 34.
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A CPO is potentially one of many steps in the victim's decision-making process regarding the course of her relationship with
the batterer. 63 Viewing orders in this way may provide another
answer to the question of how courts can simultaneously respect
a victim's autonomy while facilitating her safety. A number of
studies have suggested that victims use the law as part of a strategic, long-term process to promote their safety.2 64 Having
achieved their goal of managing the violence, they disengage
2 65
from the legal system.
If protection orders are viewed as part of a process, what
may be most critical is access to, rather than maintenance of,
these orders. As some judges hearing protection order cases
have stated, when a court denies a victim's motion to vacate, it
discourages victims from applying for protection orders when
they need them.2 66 By respecting the victim's wish to vacate, and
encouraging her to return to court when necessary, the court furthers the policy goal of sending the message that it will not tolerate domestic violence while simultaneously respecting victim
autonomy.
One state's judicial guidelines regarding vacatur of protection orders embraces both of these answers to the question of
how courts can simultaneously promote victim autonomy and
public policy, and the guidelines do so even in the instance in
which protection of children is at issue.
The courts alone cannot protect a victim of family violence
from an abuser who is undeterred by the threat of arrest or
incarceration. A victim of such abuse is in the best position to
decide what course of action will provide more safety. At a
given time, a restraining order might exacerbate the plaintiff's
danger. Thus, the plaintiff's decision to vacate an order must
be respected. Similarly, a plaintiff may feel compelled for economic or family reasons to seek to vacate a protective order.
There can be no guarantee of adequate support for families in
263. Jo-Anne Wemmers & Marie-Marthe Cousineau, Victim Needs and Conjugal
Violence Do Victims Want Decision-Making Power?, 22 CONFLICT RESOLUTION
QUARTERLY 493, 494 (2005).
264. Id. The authors summarize several studies.
265. Lauren Bennett, Lisa A. Goodman & Mary Ann Dutton, Systemic Obstacles
to the Criminal Prosecution of a Battering Partner, 14 J. OF INTERPERSONAL VIO-

761, 769 (1999) (explaining that some victims leave the court process because
it has served their needs).
266. See IJ v. IS, 744 A.2d 1246 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1999), discussed supra
Section VA, and Carfagno v. Carfagno, 672 A.2d 751 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1995),
discussed supra Section VB.
LENCE
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all situations, and the court cannot ensure that children or
others will not suffer if the protective order is maintained ...
If the judge has reason to believe that vacating the protective
order will place minor children in danger of physical harm or
other abuse, the judge should advise the plaintiff that a report
[to child protective services] ...would be filed immediately.

Once a plaintiff has appeared before the court to vacate an
order, it may be difficult to return no matter how great the
danger. The judge should anticipate this by assuring the plaintiff that he or she may always return to the court to seek a new
267
order or to bring criminal complaints for criminal activity.
If mandatory interventions in the criminal justice system diminish victim input and autonomy, but autonomy in the form of
personal choice regarding their cases is critical to victims as part
of a process of determining the course of their relationships, the
civil justice system's response to domestic violence must provide
procedures that allow victims to express their needs, and that
take their views into consideration.
The above court guidelines present one possibility for accommodating these needs. At the same time, the guidelines do
not dilute the seriousness with which the state views domestic
violence. They recognize the prevalence of domestic violence,
but also acknowledge that the existence of a CPO alone, without
the input of the victim regarding its effect and her assessment of
danger, is an insufficient remedy for preventing that violence.
Ptacek described protection order litigation as an interactive
process, "a negotiation between women and the state over protection from violent and abusive men. ' 268 Mandatory interventions in the criminal system are not interactive; they do not allow
room for victims to negotiate with the state. If the civil system
fails to provide this room, victims may be left with no effective
legal recourse against batterers, because they may be too discouraged to access those that are available. This cannot be what
policymakers, legislators and the drafters of protection order legislation intended when they directed the state, through its courts,
to convey the message that domestic violence will not be
tolerated.

267. Massachusetts Guidelinesfor Judicial Practice,supra note 161.
268. PTACEK, supra note 179, at 7.
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CONCLUSION

The drafters of protection order legislation intended that
victims have autonomy of decision-making in their CPO cases.
They also wanted the state to take domestic violence seriously, to
treat it as a public problem, and to convey the message that the
state will not tolerate domestic violence.
When victims seek to vacate their CPOs, these policies may
collide. Judges understandably struggle with the inherent tension
between them. In the absence of state law, this article suggested
that one place a state court judge might find guidance is in the
federal doctrine regarding vacatur of traditional injunctions.
There, deference to the parties' decision to vacate, when that decision is uncontested, is a longstanding principle.
The problem with the analogy is that CPOs are not antitrust
cases, largely the subject matter of traditional injunctions. Nonetheless, they provide a yardstick by which judges may measure
how greatly their decisions are skewed by legitimate factors, such
as the coercion of a victim of domestic violence by her abusive
partner, or by illegitimate factors, such as victim blaming or overreliance on the efficacy of protection orders. These factors may
be influencing judges' decisions, even subconsciously, toward being safe rather than sorry.
Paradoxically, this bias may put victims in greater danger,
given the importance of victim autonomy to victim safety. By
failing to listen and respond to victims' needs, judges may jeopardize, rather than promote, their safety and the safety of their
children. Given that the criminal justice system already diminishes victim input and autonomy, this article argues that, despite
the risk inherent in vacating victims' orders, judges in the civil
system must respect victim autonomy by deferring to the victim's
decision to vacate.

